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IS THE PARTY OVER?
EXAMINING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
PROPOSITION 14 AS IT RELATES TO
BALLOT ACCESS FOR MINOR PARTIES
Jessica A. Levinson*
The U.S. Supreme Court must reexamine its deeply flawed ballot access
jurisprudence. California voters passed Proposition 14 on June 8,
2010. This law reduces ballot access for minor parties. This Article
argues that the Court has historically overestimated the government
interests at stake in restricting ballot access, while derogating the
important role that minor parties can play in elections. This must stop.
This Article further argues that the Court should apply strict scrutiny to
ballot access restrictions and use a holistic approach when examining
such restrictions.

* Jessica Levinson is the Director of Political Reform at the Center for Governmental
Studies (CGS) and an adjunct professor at Loyola Law School Los Angeles. Her work focuses on
election law and governance issues, including campaign finance, ethics, ballot initiatives,
redistricting, term limits, and state budgets. She clerked in the Central District of California for
the Honorable James V. Selna. She received her J.D. from Loyola Law School Los Angeles,
where she graduated cum laude and Order of the Coif, and her B.A. in English and Economics
from Loyola Marymount University, where she graduated magna cum laude and as the class
valedictorian. The views expressed in this Article belong solely to the author. This author wishes
to thank Professors Richard Hasen, Allan Ides, Laurie Levenson, Christopher May, Florrie
Roberts, and Sean Scott for their endless support and inspiration as professors, mentors, and
friends. This Article is possible because of the immeasurable encouragement of Fay and Mark
Levinson. Special thanks to Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review Editor-in-Chief Elena DeCoste
Grieco and editors Miranda Mossavar and Heather Zinkiewicz, and the other editors and staffers
who worked on this Article for their extraordinary work.
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INTRODUCTION
U.S. Supreme Court case law surrounding ballot access for
minor parties is nothing less than a muddled morass. Mired in
inconsistencies and ill-conceived notions, Proposition 14, passed by
California voters in June 2010, will not only create open primary,
top-two elections in the Golden State but will also give the Supreme
Court another opportunity to determine the constitutional bounds of
restrictions on minor parties’ abilities to reach election ballots. Under
Proposition 14, any registered voter will be able to vote for any
candidate in the primary election.1 Candidates will list their party
preference, or lack of preference, on the ballot.2 The top two votegetters, regardless of party preference, will proceed to the general
election.3 Therefore, in some districts two candidates who designate
the same party preference could compete in the general election.
For some minor parties in California, Proposition 14 could
sound the death knell by making it harder for them to retain ballotqualified status. This may pose constitutional problems because
candidates can only list their party preference for a ballot-qualified
party.4 This problem is compounded by the fact that Proposition 14
prohibits the counting of ballots cast for write-in candidates in the

1. S. Constitutional Amendment 4, 2009 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2009), available at
http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/ballot-measures/pdf/sca-4-bill-20090219-chaptered.pdf. Senate
Constitutional Amendment 4 appeared on the June 8, 2010, California Statewide Ballot as
Proposition 14, see California Proposition 14, Top Two Primaries Act (June 2010),
BALLOTPEDIA,
http://ballotpedia.org/wiki/index.php/California_Proposition_14,_Top_Two_
Primaries_Act_(June_2010), and applies to state legislative and congressional elections, but not
to presidential elections. S. Constitutional Amendment 4. California Proposition 14 is now
codified as CAL. CONST. art. II, §§ 5–6.
2. CAL. CONST. art. II, §§ 5–6.
3. Id.
4. Id. Pursuant to California Elections Code section 13107, candidates do not have to
include any ballot designation. CAL. ELEC. CODE § 13107 (West 2010). A candidate can get her
name on the primary election ballot in California by following a number of procedural steps,
including paying a filing fee or gathering a certain number of signatures. For instance, candidates
for state legislature can pay a filing fee equal to 1 percent of the first year’s salary of a state
legislator. Id. §§ 8103, 8105. The California Elections Code also provides that in lieu of a filing
fee, candidates can submit a petition containing signatures of registered voters depending on the
office sought. Assembly candidates must obtain 1,500 signatures. Id. § 8106(a)(1). State Senate
and Congressional candidates must obtain 3,000 signatures. Id. § 8106(a)(2). Candidates for
statewide office must obtain 10,000 signatures. Id. § 8106(a)(3). Further, candidates seeking the
nomination of a qualified party whose registered voters constituted less than 5 percent of all the
registered voters eligible to vote in the previous statewide election, can submit a petition
containing 150 signatures or the signatures of 10 percent of the registered voters of that party in
the district in which she seeks nomination. Id. § 8106(a)(6).
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general election.5 The write-in prohibition further reduces voters’
ability to cast ballots for candidates of their choosing and makes the
ballot access scheme that Proposition 14 imposes even more
restrictive. The question is: Does Proposition 14, in conjunction with
other California ballot access laws, act to unconstitutionally infringe
on minor parties’ ballot access rights and voters’ rights to cast
meaningful votes and to associate with others to further common
political beliefs?6
Part I of this Article explains why Proposition 14 will make it
more arduous for minor parties to remain ballot qualified in
California. Part I also briefly discusses the issue of write-in voting.
Part II of this Article summarizes and analyzes the U.S. Supreme
Court’s jurisprudence concerning analogous restrictions, those
related to a minor party’s or an independent candidate’s ability to
obtain ballot access. The Supreme Court has never reviewed a ballot
access issue that is identical to the one presented in this Article,
where candidates can obtain a place on the ballot but may not be able
to list their preferred party designation. However, it is important to
analyze the Court’s thinking on similar restrictions, in part because
lower courts follow the Supreme Court’s lead when analyzing
identical restrictions. Part II also focuses on level-of-support
requirements, one type of ballot access restriction, and briefly
discusses two filing-fee cases that inform the Court’s level-ofsupport jurisprudence.7 Part III of this Article summarizes and
5. CAL. CONST. art. II, §§ 5–6.
6. There are other, potentially viable, constitutional challenges that can be made against
Proposition 14. First, similar to claims made in ongoing litigation in Washington State concerning
a similar open-primary, top-two electoral system, some may claim that voters are confused and
think that the candidates who proceed to the general election are that parties’ nominee(s). This
would infringe on political party associational rights. Grange v. Wash. Republican Party, 552
U.S. 442, 451 (2008); California v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 582–86 (2000). Second, some may
contend that Proposition 14 infringes on political party trademark rights with respect to party
names. Third, there has already been a complaint filed, which contends that, among other things,
Proposition 14 will disenfranchise and discriminate against a class of voters because it does not
allow for the counting of votes cast for write-in candidates. See Complaint at 2, Field v. Bowen,
No. CGC-10-502018 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 16, 2010). On September 14, 2010, California
Superior Court Judge Charlotte Woolard dismissed the plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary
injunction. Richard Winger, Lower California Court Temporarily Rules That Write-In Space Is
Not to Be Printed on November Ballots for Congress and State Office, BALLOT ACCESS NEWS
(Sept. 13, 2010), http://www.ballot-access.org/2010/09/13/lower-california-court-tentativelyrules-that-write-in-space-is-not-to-be-printed-on-november-ballots-for-congress-and-state-office/.
The prohibition against the counting of write-in votes will be discussed in this Article.
7. This Article is not a comprehensive review of the Court’s ballot access case law. For
instance, this Article omits a discussion of cases dealing with anti-fusion laws.
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analyzes lower court cases that address the same type of restriction
presented by the California Elections Code, namely restrictions that
prevent candidates from designating their preferred party on the
ballot. Part IV of this Article argues that the Court must apply strict
scrutiny to the ballot access issue raised by Proposition 14. In doing
this, the Court should recognize the importance of candidates’ ability
to designate a minor-party preference. The Court should additionally
recognize that (1) the importance of the governmental interests at
issue in ballot access cases are routinely overestimated and (2) many
of those governmental interests are not even implicated by
Proposition 14 and California’s ballot access laws. Part V of this
Article proposes a quick fix to the California Elections Code that
would alleviate many of the ballot access problems that
Proposition 14 creates.
I. WHAT TYPE OF ELECTORAL SYSTEM DOES PROPOSITION 14
IMPLEMENT AND WHAT CONSEQUENCES WILL IT HAVE ON
BALLOT ACCESS ISSUES?
California’s lawmakers agreed to put Proposition 14 on the June
2010 election ballot in order to secure then–State Senator Abel
Maldonado’s vote on California’s 2010 budget.8 The measure’s
proponents claim that an open primary, top-two election system will
increase: (1) voter choice in the primary; (2) primary voter turnout;
(3) competition; and (4) the number of moderate politicians in the
legislature because successful candidates will have to appeal to a
larger spectrum of the electorate.9 The measure’s opponents contend
that Proposition 14 will actually decrease voter choice because only
two candidates will appear on the general election ballot, and the
proposition prohibits the counting of write-in votes in the general
8. Wyatt Buchanan, Will Prop. 14 Open Elections, or Close Them?, SFGATE.COM
(May 22, 2010), http://articles.sfgate.com/2010-05-22/news/20909425_1_congressional-raceselections-prop.
9. Torey Van Oot, Bowen: “Army of Lawyers” at the Ready If Prop 14 Passes,
SACRAMENTO BEE (June 8, 2010), http://blogs.sacbee.com/capitolalertlatest/2010/06/bowenarmy-of-l.html; see also ERIC MCGHEE, PUB. POLICY INST. OF CAL., OPEN PRIMARIES 4, 5
(2010), available at http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/atissue/AI_210EMAI.pdf (recognizing that
the “most commonly cited goal . . . is to make it easier for relatively moderate candidates to be
elected to public office”); Ryan Wessels, Open Primaries in California: The Future of
Proposition 14, ROSE INST. OF STATE AND LOCAL GOV’T (Mar. 11, 2010, 8:27PM),
http://rosereport.org/20100311/open-primaries-in-california-the-future-of-proposition-14/
(comparing the proposed Proposition 14 to Washington State’s Initiative No. 872 and California’s
failed Proposition 62).
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election.10 Opponents also contend that Proposition 14 could lead to:
(1) voter confusion because voters will erroneously think they are
voting for a party nominee in the general election; (2) more
expensive elections because candidates will have to appeal to the
entire electorate in both the primary and the general elections;11 and
(3) party raiding, a phenomenon in which voters will vote for the
weakest candidate in the opposing party during the primary election
to help their party’s candidate win the general election.12
Regardless of the propriety of those claims, Proposition 14 could
spell the demise of some minor parties in California. Currently there
are six recognized political parties in California: Democratic,
Republican, American Independent, Green, Libertarian, and Peace
and Freedom.13 Democrats, Republicans, and voters who are
registered as Decline-to-State currently make up 95.5 percent of the
electorate.14 Put another way, members of minor parties constitute
4.5 percent of registered voters.15
A. Proposition 14 Will Eliminate the Easiest Route for
Minor Parties to Remain Ballot Qualified
Recognized parties can remain ballot qualified by one of three
routes. First, parties can poll 2 percent of the vote for any statewide
race in a nonpresidential (midterm) year on a general election
ballot.16 Second, parties can obtain registration numbers of 1 percent
of the previous gubernatorial vote.17 Third, parties can garner petition
signatures from at least 10 percent of registered voters.18
It is much easier for minor parties to remain ballot qualified via
the first route, the two-percent-participation test, than the other two
routes. In the 2006 gubernatorial election, the 2 percent participation

10.
11.
12.
13.

Van Oot, supra note 9.
Wessels, supra note 9.
MCGHEE, supra note 9.
CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, QUALIFIED POLITICAL PARTIES FOR THE JUNE 8, 2010,
STATEWIDE DIRECT PRIMARY ELECTION (2010), available at http://www.sos.ca.gov/
elections/ror/ror-pages/15day-prim-10/qual-pol-parties.pdf.
14. CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, 15-DAY REPORT OF REGISTRATION (2010), available at
http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/ror/ror-pages/15day-prim-10/hist-reg-stats.pdf.
15. Id.
16. CAL. ELEC. CODE § 5100 (West 2010).
17. Id.
18. Id.
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threshold was just shy of 175,000 votes.19 With respect to the second
route, the one-percent-registration test, history has shown that it is an
arduous task for many small parties to obtain enough registered
members to remain ballot qualified.20 A little less than 9 million
people voted in the 2006 gubernatorial election.21 That means that to
maintain ballot-qualified status, a minor party must have almost
90,000 registered members.22 The third route, garnering petition
signatures from 10 percent of registered voters, is an all-butimpossible hill for third parties to climb.23
Two of the four qualified minor parties in California, the Peace
and Freedom Party and the Libertarian Party, would fail to retain
ballot-qualified status if they were required to satisfy the second test,
the one-percent-registration test.24 There are approximately 55,000
registered Peace and Freedom Party members25 and 85,000 registered
Libertarian Party members.26 Hence each of these parties falls short
of the 90,000 registered members needed under the one-percentregistration test. Only the American Independent Party, with a little
over 380,000 members, and the Green Party, with about 110,000
members, would remain ballot qualified under the one-percentregistration test.27
Under Proposition 14, the two-percent-participation test, the
easiest mechanism for minor parties to remain ballot qualified, would
19. John Seiler, Will Prop. 14 Kill Third Parties?, CAL WATCHDOG (Oct. 19, 2010),
http://www.calwatchdog.com/2010/02/19/new-will-prop-14-kill-third-parties.
20. Richard Winger, The Hidden Zinger in Prop. 14, S.F. BAY GUARDIAN (June 1, 2010,
11:47 AM), http://www.sfbg.com/2010/06/01/hidden-zinger-prop-14.
21. The 2006 California gubernatorial election saw 8,899,059 voters. CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE,
HISTORICAL VOTER REGISTRATION AND PARTICIPATION IN STATEWIDE GENERAL ELECTIONS
1910–2009 (2009), available at http://www.sos.ca.gov/ elections/sov/historical-voter-reg/histvoter-reg-and-part-general-elections-1910-2009.pdf.
22. It is important to look beyond the raw numbers, as it is easier to obtain participation as
opposed to registration.
23. Seiler, supra note 19.
24. Wyatt Buchanan, Ballot Measure Would Provide Open Primaries, SFGATE.COM (Mar.
11, 2010), http://articles.sfgate.com/2010-03-11/news/18384775_1_freedom-party-californiaelections-candidates; see also Winger, supra note 20 (recognizing that it is easier for minority
parties to remain ballot qualified by polling 2 percent of the vote, but that it is more difficult for
minority parties to register 1 percent of the voters in the previous general election).
25. Party: Peace and Freedom, JOINCALIFORNIA, http://www.joincalifornia.com/
party/Peace%20and%20Freedom (last visited Oct. 19, 2010).
26. Party: Libertarian, JOINCALIFORNIA, http://www.joincalifornia.com/party/Libertarian
(last visited Oct. 19, 2010).
27. Buchanan, supra note 8.
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be effectively eliminated. Members of minor parties would rarely be
among the top two vote-getters in the primary election, and therefore
would not proceed to the general election under Proposition 14.28
Because it is more arduous to remain ballot qualified under the onepercent-registration test and half the minor parties in California
would fail to retain ballot-qualified status under that test, the
enactment of Proposition 14 could be constitutionally problematic.
Why is a party’s ability to maintain ballot-qualified status
important under Proposition 14, which leaves candidates free to
designate their party preference? Under other provisions of the
California Elections Code, members of unqualified parties cannot list
their party preference on a primary election ballot.29 Therefore, for a
candidate to designate her preference for a minor party on the
electoral ballot, that party must retain its ballot-qualified status.
Based on recent data, half of the ballot-qualified minor parties in
California would lose that status, and candidates wishing to list their
preference for any of those parties would be barred from doing so.
B. Proposition 14 Prohibits the Counting of Write-in Votes
Adding insult to injury, a law passed to implement
Proposition 14 specifically prohibits the counting of write-in votes in
the general election.30 The wrinkle here is that the ballot access

28. It should be noted that if parties remain ballot qualified, Proposition 14 could help ballotqualified minor parties garner more votes in the primary election than under California’s current
electoral system, as minor-party candidates could garner votes from all registered voters, not just
those who are registered members of a minor party.
29. Senate Bill 6 (“SB 6”) requires that candidates must register to vote and identify a
political party with which they choose to identify. California Elections Code section 338 defines a
political party as an organization or party that is ballot qualified. CAL. ELEC. CODE § 338 (West
2010); S. 6, 2009 Leg. Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2009) (version passed by Senate); see also Winger, supra
note 20 (stating that members of unqualified minor parties will not be able to list their party
preference).
30. On February 19, 2009, the legislature amended and passed SB 6, which was intended to
implement Proposition 14. See S. 6, supra note 29; Matthew Yi & Wyatt Buchanan, State
Legislature
Passes
Emergency
Budget
Plan,
SFGATE.COM
(Feb. 19,
2009),
http://articles.sfgate.com/2009-02-19/news/17190540_1_budget-plan-state-income-tax-gop-vote;
see also Complaint, Field v. Bowen, No. CGC-10-502018, (Cal. Super. Ct. July 28, 2010),
available
at
http://gautamdutta.files.wordpress.com/2010/07/sb-6-complaint-7-28-102.pdf
(illustrating the legal difference between existing law and SB 6); SENATE RULES COMM., SENATE
BILL ANALYSIS FOR SB 6, at 2 (2009), available at http://info.sen.ca.gov/pub/0910/bill/sen/sb_0001-0050/sb_6_cfa_20090219_031945_sen_floor.html (prohibiting the counting
of write-in votes in a general election). SB 6 prohibits the counting of write-in ballots in the
general election. S. 6, supra note 29. This may be in conflict with a California Elections Code
provision that states that “[e]ach voter is entitled to write the name of any candidate for any
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restriction discussed in this Article focuses on a candidate’s ability to
designate her party preference in the primary (as minor-party
candidates are unlikely to be among the top-two vote-getters to
proceed to the general election), and the write-in ban applies in the
general election. As stated, the write-in prohibition adds to the
restrictive nature of California’s ballot access scheme and hence
should at least be acknowledged in this Article.
This write-in ban means that voters will likely have no way of
casting a vote for a candidate wishing to designate her preference for
a nonqualified party in the general election. This is problematic
because, as discussed in this Article, the Supreme Court has upheld
certain ballot access restrictions on the grounds that those restrictions
provide for write-in votes.
Under the 1992 Supreme Court decision Burdick v. Takushi,31
there is no constitutional right to cast a write-in vote.32 Justice White,
writing for the majority, found that Hawaii’s ban on write-in voting
did not unreasonably infringe on petitioner’s First Amendment rights
of expression and association.33 The Court upheld the ban on write-in
votes in large part because it found there were suitable alternative
mechanisms through which a candidate could obtain access to the
primary ballot.34
public office, including that of President and Vice President of the United States, on the ballot of
any election.” CAL. ELEC. CODE § 15340 (West 2010).
31. 504 U.S. 428 (1992).
32. Id. at 430, 437, 440.
33. Id. at 440.
34. Id. at 436. The Court later emphasized that Hawaii’s election code provided candidates
with “adequate ballot access” and that therefore the ban on write-in voting gave rise to only a
minimal burden on voters’ rights. Id. at 438–39. Justice Kennedy, in his dissent, vehemently
disagreed with the Court’s conclusion on this issue, stating instead that “Hawaii’s ballot access
laws taken as a whole impose a significant impediment to third-party or independent
candidacies.” Id. at 443 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). As Justice Kennedy asserts in his dissent, “For
those who are affected by write-in bans, the infringement on their right to vote for the candidate
of their choice is total.” Id. at 447. In the majority opinion, Justice White listed what he viewed as
the suitable alternatives to ballot access. First, any group who obtained the signatures of at least
1 percent of Hawaii’s registered voters could file a party petition 150 days before the primary. Id.
at 435 (majority opinion). The dissent points out that the majority paid little heed to the early
filing deadline to gather signatures for a party petition—a deadline that is five months before the
primary election, which is before some groups may have an organizational structure in place to
meet such a requirement. Id. at 443 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Second, a candidate could appear
on the Hawaii primary ballot by being a member of an established party. Id. at 435–36 (majority
opinion). Established parties are those parties that qualified by petition for three back-to-back
elections and received a certain percentage of the vote. Third, a candidate could appear on the
primary ballot through the nonpartisan ballot. Id. at 436. Candidates could be placed on the
nonpartisan ballot by filing nominating papers containing fifteen to twenty-five signatures sixty
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The Court found that Hawaii’s ban on write-in voting served a
number of state interests.35 First, the Court stated that the prohibition
served to avoid the potential of “unrestrained factionalism at the
general election.”36 To that end, the Court found that the prohibition
could serve to eliminate the possibility of sore-loser candidacies in
the general election.37
The Court also found that Hawaii’s ban against write-in voting
was necessary to avoid “party raiding.”38 The dissent found this state
interest to be “suspect” because, by allowing open primaries, the
state created the party-raiding problem.39 The dissent’s point is
equally applicable to California’s Proposition 14 scenario.
Another state interest that the Court found to be furthered by
Hawaii’s ban on write-in votes is inapplicable to the issue discussed
in this Article. The Court found that Hawaii’s law served to allow
unopposed winners to hold office without having to participate in a
general election.40 First, this conclusion is indeed curious. If Hawaii
eliminated general elections, a voter would have no ability to cast a
write-in vote.41 Second, this interest is not implicated under
California law, as Proposition 14 dictates a general election
regardless of the percentage of the votes garnered by either of the
top-two vote-getters.42
The Court went further than merely upholding Hawaii’s law and
found that when a state’s ballot access laws impose “only reasonable
burdens” on a voter’s First Amendment rights, “a prohibition on

days before the primary. Id. The dissent noted that while the requirements to obtain a position on
a nonpartisan ballot were not overly burdensome, voters could only choose one ballot, and
therefore voters in Hawaii faced a difficult choice. Id. at 443–44 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Once a
voter opts to use a nonpartisan ballot, that voter has to give up the chance to vote for a candidate
from an established party in every other race. Id. at 444.
35. Some of these interests bear on the issues raised by Proposition 14, and others do not.
36. Id. at 439 (majority opinion) (citing Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 415 U.S. 189, 196
(1986)).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 449 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
40. Id. at 439 (majority opinion).
41. Id. at 449 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
42. See, e.g., Wessels, supra note 9 (discussing Proposition 14’s provision for a mandatory
runoff election between the top-two primary vote-getters regardless of their party affiliation).
However, there is no runoff in a special election wherever one candidate gets a majority of the
votes in the primary election. CAL. ELEC. CODE § 10706 (West 2010).
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write-in voting will be presumptively valid.”43 In dissent, Justice
Kennedy rejected this presumption, correctly explaining that it is
circular because the ability of voters to cast write-in votes must be
one factor that is weighed when determining whether a state’s ballot
access laws pass constitutional muster.44 Hence the Court’s reasons
for upholding the write-in prohibition in Burdick do not apply with
equal force to California’s prohibition on the counting of write-in
votes in the general election. However, because of Justice White’s
proclamation that bans on write-in voting can be presumptively
valid, the Court could uphold California’s prohibition.
II. WHAT HAS THE SUPREME COURT SAID ABOUT
BALLOT ACCESS RESTRICTIONS?
While there are few, if any, bright-line rules that apply to
Supreme Court decisions surrounding ballot access for minor parties,
some things remain clear. Most of the Supreme Court’s recent
jurisprudence underestimates the importance of minor parties in
American democracy and protects the duopoly that the two major
parties have over the political process.45 The Supreme Court has
incorrectly found that there is little expressive value in a citizen’s
ballot-box decision of whom to vote for or against and has instead
held that elections are only about picking a winning candidate.46
Similarly, the Court fundamentally misreads the importance of minor
parties to an open and robust political debate. In addition, the Court
has given undue weight to claims by state legislatures (made up
overwhelmingly of members of the two major parties) that minor
parties threaten stable and orderly elections.47 By doing this, the
43. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 441.
44. Id. at 447 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
45. See generally Dmitri Evseev, A Second Look at Third Parties: Correcting the Supreme
Court’s Understanding of Elections, 85 B.U. L. REV. 1277, 1277–78 (2005) (arguing that the
Supreme Court’s ballot access rulings often disfavor minor parties and protect the two dominant
parties); see also Jamie Raskin, A Right-to-Vote Amendment for the U.S. Constitution:
Confronting America’s Structural Democracy Deficit, 3 ELECTION L.J. 559, 570 (2004) (“When
states have created discriminatory statutory mechanisms that interfere with the freedom of third
party and Independent voters and candidates to participate in elections, the Court has upheld them
as ‘reasonable’ regulations in favor of the ‘two party system,’ an imaginary construct with no
basis in our Constitution, which does not mention parties, much less two specific parties or a ‘two
party system.’”).
46. Evseev, supra note 45, at 1280.
47. Id.; see also Raskin, supra note 45, at 572 (“Right now the Supreme Court reasons
backwards and upside-down from the imagined needs of the ‘two party system’ or ‘political
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Court has failed to properly weigh the justifications that legislators
proffer in favor of ballot access restrictions. If ever there were an
area in which heightened judicial review of legislators’ decisions
were justified, it is one in which legislators’ decisions can directly
increase or decrease their chances of reelection. Even if minor-party
candidates cannot realistically unseat incumbents, such candidates
can make reelection bids more arduous for certain incumbents.48
Ballot access cases implicate both the First Amendment’s
expressive and associational rights and the Equal Protection Clause’s
protections against discrimination. The Court’s decisions have
alternatively rested on one or both of these rights.
A. Supreme Court Case Law, While Distinguishable,
Informs the Current Inquiry
Supreme Court case law addressing the level of support a
candidate or minor party needs in order to obtain access to the ballot
is slightly different from the level-of-support issue raised in this
Article for two reasons. First, the Supreme Court has yet to review
the issue presented by this Article: a ballot-qualified candidate’s
ability to designate her preferred party on the ballot. The only
restriction that the Supreme Court has reviewed is the restriction that
prevents a minor-party or independent candidate from appearing on a
ballot. However, it is important to review the Supreme Court’s
decisions because lower courts rely on Supreme Court rulings. In
addition, the Court’s thinking on similar ballot access restrictions
portends its analysis of the issue raised by this Article.
One question posited throughout this Article is if a candidate
obtains a position on the ballot without being able to list her party
preference, is it similar to preventing her from obtaining any position
on the ballot at all, particularly given many voters’ lack of
knowledge about anything related to candidates other than their party
affiliations.
Second, there is another, more minor, distinction between the
Supreme Court case law discussed in this section and the restrictions
that will befall minor parties and those who wish to vote for minorstability,’ rather than forward and ground-up from the essential political rights of the citizen, the
only standpoint from which a truly open and competitive democracy can grow.”).
48. See generally Richard Winger, The Supreme Court and the Burial of Ballot Access: A
Critical Review of Jenness v. Fortson, 1 ELECTION L.J. 235, 236–37 (2002) (discussing the
proliferation of state laws to hinder the ability of minor-party candidates to gain ballot access).
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party members after the implementation of Proposition 14. Supreme
Court case law dealing with the level of support that a minor-party or
independent candidate must achieve prior to obtaining ballot access
typically addresses access to the general election ballot. Often in
those cases, though not always, the general election ballot is the only
opportunity for a minor-party or independent candidate to reach a
statewide ballot.
In California minor parties must demonstrate a certain level of
support in order for candidates to be able to list their party preference
on the primary election ballot. Then, to obtain a position on the
general election ballot, a candidate has to be among the top-two votegetters.49 However, under open-primary, top-two election systems,
the primary election is akin to a general election, because it
determines only who proceeds to the top-two runoff election, and
there is not a party-nomination process. Similarly, the general
election is akin to a runoff election.50 In addition, the primary
election ballot is likely the only ballot to which minor-party members
will obtain ballot access. Therefore, that Supreme Court case law
49. It is quite difficult to determine how many votes a candidate would have to garner to be
among the top-two vote-getters. This depends on a number of factors that are hard to model and
predict, given that California now operates within a semi-closed primary electoral system. For
instance, the determination of the top-two vote-getters depends on the number of candidates
appearing on the primary election ballot and voter behavior in a new electoral system—one in
which any voter can vote for any candidate, regardless of party preference or affiliation. In any
event, it does seem unlikely that minor-party members would be among the top-two vote-getters.
As the media has reported, Proposition 14 “is likely to exclude third-party candidates from the
runoff ballot in virtually all contested elections.” Bob Egelko, Prop. 14 Open Primary Survives
First Challenge, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 15, 2010, at C-1, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgibin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2010/09/14/BAS01FDVRA.DTL.
50. There would be no doubt, the Washington district court found in reviewing an openprimary, top-two election system, that on certain ballot access grounds Washington’s election
system would be constitutional “if the ‘primary’ were renamed a ‘general election,’ and the
‘general election’ were renamed a ‘runoff.’” Wash. State Republican Party v. Wash. State
Grange, No. C05-0927-JCC, at 13 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 20, 2009), available at
http://www.sos.wa.gov/_assets/elections/DistrictCourtOrder82009.pdf (issuing an order granting
in part and denying in part the defendants’ motion to dismiss; granting in part and denying in part
the Democratic Party’s motion to amend and supplement its complaint and the Republican Party’s
motion for leave to file a supplemental and amended complaint; and granting in part and denying
in part the state of Washington’s motion to recover attorney fees and costs). The Court concluded
that “the constitutionality of the election statute cannot turn on the identifiers used for its various
provisions.” Id. In support of this conclusion the Court pointed to California v. Jones, 530 U.S.
567 (2000), in which the Court approved of a top-two general election following nonpartisan
primaries. Wash. State Republican Party, at 13. It should be noted that the difference between the
hypothetical scheme approved of by the Jones Court and the Washington and California election
systems is that primaries held in Washington and California are not nonpartisan, but rather most
candidates designate their party preference. Id.
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deals with access to the general election, and that this Article
addresses access to the primary election, makes little difference.
Other than the following brief discussion, this Article leaves for
another day the question of whether a top-two general-election
system impermissibly infringes on the rights of minor parties and
their members to obtain general-election access. At first blush this
appears less constitutionally problematic than the issue of access to
the primary election ballot. In 2009, a district court in Washington
State reviewing that state’s open-primary, top-two election system,
granted a motion to dismiss the Libertarian Party’s claim that the
top-two general-election system acted to impermissibly limit its
ability to reach the general election ballot.51 The district court found
much of the Court’s ballot access case law distinguishable because in
those cases “the general election was a minor party’s only
opportunity to reach the statewide electorate by ballot.”52 The district
court’s ruling rested on the fact that Washington’s scheme, in
contrast to the laws reviewed by the Supreme Court, “virtually
guarantee[d]” minor-party access to the primary election ballot.53 In
Washington, candidates can designate their preference for any
party.54 Hence the district court upheld the law based on a finding
that a minor party having access to at least one ballot is
constitutionally sufficient.
The key difference between the Washington election system
upheld in Washington State Republican Party v. Washington State
Grange55 and the election system under Proposition 14 is that minor
parties are not virtually guaranteed access to at least one election
ballot under the latter system. To the contrary, as it stands, half of the
minor parties that are now ballot qualified would fail to retain that
status. Hence, while minor-party candidates could appear on the
ballot, candidates who wished to designate their party preference for
either of those parties (the Libertarian Party or the Peace and
Freedom Party) would be prohibited from doing so on the primary

51. Wash. State Republican Party v. Wash. State Grange, No. C05-0927-JCC (W.D. Wash.
Aug. 20,
2009),
available
at
http://www.sos.wa.gov/assets/elections/
DistrictCourtOrder82009.pdf.
52. Id. at 12 (emphasis added).
53. Id. at 12–13.
54. See id. at 10.
55. No. C05-0927-JCC (W.D. Wash. Aug. 20, 2009).
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election ballot and would be unlikely to be among the top-two votegetters to proceed to the primary.
This Article, instead of focusing on access to the general
election ballot, addresses—in part by analyzing Supreme Court case
law dealing generally with access to the general election—whether
California laws impermissibly infringe on ballot access rights by
preventing candidates from listing their preference for a nonqualified
party in the primary election. However, as described above, this
difference is less important than initially meets the eye. First,
because in open-primary, top-two election systems the primaries do
not select a party nominee but determine only who makes it to the
top-two runoff, the general election is therefore essentially a runoff
election.
Second, many of the Supreme Court cases—as is the situation in
California—address a minor-party or independent candidate’s only
chance to obtain a position on the statewide ballot, whether it be the
primary or general election ballot. Hence, the Court’s analysis is on
point to determine the validity of California’s ballot access laws.
B. The Court’s “Level of Support”
Jurisprudence Is a Muddled Morass
This section of the Article focuses on the Court’s ballot access
case law that concerns restrictions that burden new or small parties,
or independent candidates. This case law requires that independent
candidates or minor parties display a certain level of support prior to
obtaining a place on the ballot.
The Court too often upholds level-of-support requirements on
the basis that they purportedly serve the important state interests:
“[in] protecting the integrity of their political processes from
frivolous or fraudulent candidacies, in ensuring that their election
processes are efficient, in avoiding voter confusion caused by an
overcrowded ballot, and in avoiding the expense and burden of runoff elections.”56 Indeed, much of the Court’s level-of-support
jurisprudence evidences great deference to the states when the
government claims that the restrictions “protect the integrity and
reliability of the electoral process itself.”57

56. Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957, 965 (1982).
57. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 n.9 (1983).
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The Court, misperceiving the benefits and burdens that these
restrictions impose on minor parties, typically strikes down level-ofsupport requirements only when it believes that those requirements
completely freeze minor-party members out of a place on the ballot.58
The Court wholly underestimates the injury these restrictions pose to
minor parties and the important role that minor parties and those
wishing to support minor-party candidates can play in elections.
Unfortunately, the Court’s current analysis turns the Court’s first
modern ballot access case, Williams v. Rhodes,59 on its head.
In Williams the Court struck down ballot access restrictions that
in essence prohibited any minor party from obtaining a place on the
ballot.60 The Court, however, did not find that making it all but
impossible for minor parties to obtain ballot access was the necessary
threshold required for striking down ballot access laws. The Williams
Court merely found that the restriction at issue prevented all but the
major-party members from achieving ballot positions and that the
law was invalid.61 Not until the Court’s misreading of Williams three
years later in Jenness v. Fortson62 did the Court set an unreasonably
high threshold for striking down ballot access laws.63 Case law
following the Court’s ill-fated Jenness decision displays, with few
exceptions, hostility toward minor parties’ right to obtain ballot
access.64
The Court eventually adopted a balancing test applicable to
ballot access restrictions.65 This ad hoc balancing test gives the Court
doctrinal cover to underestimate minor parties’ rights and
overestimate states’ interest in restricting minor parties’ access to
electoral ballots.
1. Williams v. Rhodes—The High-Water Mark of the
Court’s Ballot Access Protection
The modern era of ballot access cases began in 1968 with
Williams. Justice Black, writing for the majority of the Court, struck
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Clements, 457 U.S. at 965.
393 U.S. 23 (1968).
Id. at 34.
Id.
403 U.S. 431 (1971).
Id. at 441.
Winger, supra note 48, at 235–36.
Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974); see infra Part II.B.4.
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down a series of Ohio election laws on equal protection grounds. In
Ohio, among other “substantial additional burdens,” a new party had
to obtain petitions signed by qualified electors, equal to at least
15 percent of the number of ballots cast in the last gubernatorial
election, in order “to be placed on the state ballot to choose electors
pledged to particular candidates for the Presidency and Vice
Presidency of the United States.”66 In Williams, members of a new
party desired a place on the Ohio ballot for the November general
election.67
The Court held that the Ohio election laws made it “virtually
impossible” for any party other than the Republican and Democratic
Parties to qualify for the ballot.68 Hence, the law barred new political
parties or small established political parties from the state ballot.69
In analyzing Ohio’s ballot access laws, instead of parsing
through each provision to see if it, standing alone, was constitutional,
the Court took a totality-of-the-circumstances approach.70 The Court
specifically acknowledged that its analysis looked at the “totality of
the Ohio restrictive laws taken as a whole.”71
Williams firmly established that the rights of both candidates
and voters are implicated when states impose ballot access
restrictions.72 The Court explained that Ohio’s laws placed burdens
on both “the right of individuals to associate for the advancement of
political beliefs, and the right of qualified voters, regardless of their
66. Williams, 393 U.S. at 24–25.
67. Id. at 26.
68. Id. at 25.
69. The Court noted that Republican and Democratic Parties faced fewer burdens because
they could maintain their positions on the ballot by garnering 10 percent of the votes in the last
gubernatorial election, but did not need to obtain signature petitions. Id. at 25.
70. Id. at 34.
71. Id. at 34. The Court emphasized the importance of the right to vote. “Other rights, even
the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is undermined.” Id. at 30 (citations omitted).
72. In 1974, in Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709 (1974), the Court specifically acknowledged
that both parties’ and candidates’ rights and voters’ rights to cast a ballot for the candidate and
party of their choosing are implicated by ballot access restrictions. Id. at 716. The Court noted
that the right to vote is burdened if a vote can only be cast in the primary for one of two
candidates while other candidates are seeking a position on the ballot. Id. In Anderson v.
Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983), the Court began by discussing the fundamental rights of both
voters and candidates to participate in elections. Id. at 786–88. The Court emphasized that “laws
that affect candidates always have at least some theoretical, correlative effect on voters.” Id. at
786 (quoting Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972)). The Anderson Court held that its “primary
concern” with restrictions on a candidate’s ballot access is that such restrictions act to “limit the
field of candidates from which voters might choose.” Id.
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political persuasion, to cast their votes effectively.”73 These are the
two interests always at play in ballot access decisions.
The Court found that the Ohio laws gave the Republican and
Democratic Parties marked advantages over new parties and imposed
a heavy burden on the right to vote and the right to associate of those
not affiliated with either major party.74 Concluding that the laws
imposed a heavy burden, the Court applied a rigorous strict scrutiny
standard, finding that there must be a compelling state interest to
justify the restriction.75 The Court held that there was no such
interest.76
Ohio principally asserted that it could “promote a two-party
system in order to encourage compromise and political stability.”77
The Court found that Ohio’s laws did not just promote the two-party
system but rather promoted two particular parties and gave those
parties a complete duopoly.78 The state additionally asserted that,
among other things, Ohio’s laws were necessary to prevent voter
confusion and frustration, which could result from a large number of
parties qualifying for the ballot.79 The Court, however, concluded
that few parties attempted to qualify for the ballot, even when the
threshold for qualification was much lower.80
It is important to note Justice Stewart’s powerful dissent in this
landmark ballot access case because his views soon became those of
the majority of the Court. Justice Stewart called for more deference
73. Williams, 393 U.S. at 31. In Illinois State Board of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party,
440 U.S. 173 (1979), the Court acknowledged that restrictions on ballot access burden two
fundamental rights, voters’ right to association for the furtherance of political beliefs and voters’
right to cast their votes regardless of political preference. Id. at 184. The Court has thus
recognized that the rights of voters to vote and associate themselves with others for a political
purpose, and the rights of candidates to appear on the election ballot are inextricably intertwined.
Id.
74. Williams, 393 U.S. at 31. In support of that conclusion the Court first famously found
that the right to form a political party “means little if a party can be kept off the election ballot
and thus denied an equal opportunity to win votes.” Id. Second, and equally significantly, the
Court found that “the right to vote is heavily burdened if that vote may be cast only for one of two
parties at a time when other parties are clamoring for a place on the ballot.” Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.; Bradley A. Smith, Judicial Protection of Ballot-Access Rights: Third Parties Need
Not Apply, 28 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 167, 186 (1991).
76. Williams, 393 U.S. at 31.
77. Id. at 31–32.
78. Id. at 32.
79. Id. at 33.
80. Id.
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to the legislature’s judgments and categorized the majority’s opinion
as imposing the justices’ own ideas of wise policy upon the states.81
The Court’s conclusion in Williams was the correct one.82
However, many of the Court’s post-Williams rulings demonstrate a
“retreat from the broad implications of Williams.”83 Williams applied
strict scrutiny and hence performed a searching review of the state’s
asserted interests. This is the appropriate standard to employ when
dealing with questions related to the fundamental rights to cast a
meaningful ballot and to associate with others to advance common
political beliefs. Williams also correctly applied a totality-of-thecircumstances approach, taking a holistic view of how the law, as a
whole, affected third parties’ rights.
2. Jenness v. Fortson—The Court Reverses Course
Three years after and one hundred and eighty degrees from
Williams, the Court upheld a Georgia law that provided that a
candidate who did not enter and win a party’s primary election (i.e.,
a nonparty or independent candidate) could have her name on the
general election ballot only if she filed a nominating petition signed
by at least 5 percent of the number of registered voters at the last

81. Id. at 48. Justice Stewart thought the majority engaged in an inappropriate “second
guessing” as to the proper level of the qualifying threshold, and he espoused a less stringent level
of review for ballot access restrictions. Id. at 54 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Justice Stewart stated
that a law violates the Equal Protection Clause only when a “classification rests on grounds
wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State’s objective.” Id. at 51. In applying this standard,
Justice Stewart also adopted a permissive view of what can qualify as a sufficiently important
state interest to justify the restriction on ballot access rights. Justice Stewart found that the Ohio
law furthered a proper state objective “[b]y preventing parties that have not demonstrated timely
and widespread support from gaining places on its ballot.” Id. at 53. Justice Stewart found that
Ohio’s restrictions therefore helped to prevent (1) the possibility that minor parties would garner
sufficient support to block the major-party candidates from obtaining a majority of the vote; and
(2) the resulting possibility that the winner of the election garnered only a plurality and is
preferred by less than the majority of the voters. Id. at 53–54. Justice Stewart laid out an
unquestionably narrow view of the limits placed on state legislatures in making ballot access law.
Justice Stewart noted that a state legislature was limited by three constitutional amendments in
choosing its preferred process for appointing electors: (1) the Fifteenth Amendment, which
prevents voters from being excluded on the basis of race; (2) the Nineteenth Amendment, which
prevents voters from being excluded on the basis of sex; and (3) the Twenty-Fourth Amendment,
which prevents voters from being excluded on the basis of failure to pay taxes. Id. at 50. Justice
Stewart further admitted that the Fourteenth Amendment “imposes some limitations upon a state
legislature’s freedom to choose a method for the appointment of electors.” Id. at 51.
82. Smith, supra note 75, at 180.
83. Id. at 181.
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general election for the office in question.84 For purposes of
comparison, it is important to note that Georgia’s requirement was
“at least five times that of forty-two states, and at least fifty times
that of sixteen states.”85
Justice Stewart, the powerful dissenter in Williams, wrote the
majority opinion in Jenness, which set forth “[t]he undemocratic
doctrine of defining anti-third party legislation as reasonable
electoral regulation.”86 The ruling “constitutionalized political
discrimination across the land.”87
The specter of Williams loomed large over the Jenness opinion,
as Justice Stewart went to pains to distinguish the case with which he
so vehemently disagreed. While the Williams Court “focused on
infringements of fundamental rights,” the Jenness Court “scarcely
even considered such rights.”88 The Court’s analysis primarily
consisted of drawing distinctions between the Ohio statute and the
Georgia statute.89 This is a departure from the holistic approach taken
by the Court in Williams. In Jenness, the Court parsed through the
statutes, took each provision individually and found that each,
standing alone, was constitutional, as opposed to looking at the
restrictions as a whole.
In distinguishing the Ohio laws in Williams from the Georgia
statute at issue in Jenness, the Court concluded that “Georgia’s
election laws, unlike Ohio’s, do not operate to freeze the political
status quo.”90 This is a fundamental misreading of Williams, which
did not require that in order to be declared unconstitutional a law had
to “freeze the political status quo,” but rather found that the Ohio
laws did so in that case. The Court, therefore, set an unreasonably
high bar for a finding of unconstitutionality.
84. Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 432 (1971). The Court’s about-face is surprising, as
the five justices who voted in the majority in Williams to strike down the law also voted in the
majority in Jenness to uphold the law. Smith, supra note 75, at 185.
85. Smith, supra note 75, at 183.
86. Raskin, supra note 45, at 570.
87. Id. at 571.
88. Smith, supra note 75, at 181.
89. Id. The Court explained that Georgia, unlike Ohio, (1) provides for write-in votes;
(2) recognizes independent candidates and does not require that every candidate be the nominee
of a political party; (3) does not mandate an early filing deadline for those candidates who are not
endorsed by established political parties; and (4) does not require small parties or new parties to
establish complex primary election machinery. Jenness, 403 U.S. at 438.
90. Jenness, 403 U.S. at 438
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The Jenness Court found that the Georgia statute passed
constitutional muster on both First Amendment and Equal Protection
Clause grounds.91 Justice Stewart, displaying his permissive view of
a state interest sufficient to uphold ballot access restrictions,
concluded,
[t]here is surely an important state interest in requiring
some preliminary showing of a significant modicum of
support before printing the name of a political
organization’s candidate on the ballot—the interest, if no
other, in avoiding confusion, deception, and even
frustration of the democratic process at the general
election.92
The Jenness Court therefore, “never seriously considered the
possibility that such interests might not be valid.”93
In sum, Justice Stewart’s application of a minimal level of
scrutiny, expansive view of a sufficiently important state interest,
and deferential approach to the state legislature “put a halt to
virtually all successful litigation against onerous ballot access
laws . . . .”94
3. Rosario v. Rockefeller95—The Court Pays Little
Heed to the Rights of Voters
In 1973, two years after the Court’s decision in Jenness, Justice
Stewart, again writing for a majority of the Court, upheld a New
91. With respect to a candidate’s equal protection claim, the Court failed to accept what it
viewed as the premise of the claim, that it is harder for a candidate to gather signatures of
5 percent of the electorate than it is to win a majority of the party primary. Id. at 440. In Georgia,
a “political party” was an organization that obtained 20 percent of the vote at the most recent
gubernatorial or presidential election. All other political organizations were deemed “political
bodies.” Political parties automatically got the names of their candidates on the primary election
ballot and the name of the winner of the primary on the general election ballot. With respect to a
political body’s equal protection claim, the Court found that a political body could not claim that
its interests would be furthered if the state forced it to adhere to the complex organizational
requirements that are a precondition of competing in Georgia’s primary elections, rather than
requiring that it obtain the requisite number of signatures. Id. at 441. The Court concluded that
there were obvious differences between large, established political parties with broad-based
support and new or small political organizations, and that it need not treat different organizations
in the same way. Id. at 441–42.
92. Id. at 442 (emphasis added).
93. Smith, supra note 75, at 182. Indeed, the Court “never explain[ed] why political parties
should have to convince pedestrian non-supporters to sign their petitions simply in order to run
for office.” Raskin, supra note 45, at 571.
94. Winger, supra note 48, at 237.
95. 410 U.S. 752 (1973).
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York statute that required a voter to join her preferred party
approximately eight to eleven months prior to the primary election in
order to be eligible to vote in that election.96 The Court’s rationale in
this case—even though the case is not a level-of-support case—helps
to explain its subsequent jurisprudence in that area. For instance, as
in later level-of-support cases, the Rosario Court gave little credence
to petitioners’ claims that their right to vote was impermissibly
infringed on and, conversely, gave undue deference to the state’s
asserted claims that the restriction acted to prevent party raiding.
Further, similar to its decisions in the level-of-support cases, the
Court failed to elucidate a standard of review and seemed to require
absolute disenfranchisement before it would grant relief. It is no
surprise that few restrictions have reached that dangerously high
level.
In Rosario, the petitioners unsuccessfully claimed that the
delayed-enrollment system unconstitutionally deprived them of their
fundamental right to vote in the primary election of their preferred
political party.97 The Court upheld the New York statute, finding that
it “did not absolutely disenfranchise the class to which the petitioners
belong—newly registered voters who were eligible to enroll in a
party before the previous general election.”98 Instead, the Court found
that the law merely delayed the time when a class of citizens could
exercise its right to vote.99
The Court’s rationale is disturbingly flawed. First, those who do
not enroll in their preferred party by the general election are in fact
totally disenfranchised from voting in the next primary election.100 As
96. Rosario, 410 U.S. 752. The law “provides an exemption from this waiting period for
certain classes of voters, including persons who have attained voting age after the last general
election, persons too ill to enroll during the previous enrollment period, and persons who moved
from one place to another within a single county.” Id. at 754.
97. Id. at 756.
98. Id. at 757 (emphasis added). The Court found that the cases on which petitioners relied
were all distinguishable because in those cases, decided on equal protection grounds, “the State
totally denied the electoral franchise to a particular class of residents, and there was no way in
which the members of that class could have made themselves eligible to vote.” Id. The Court
concluded that the New York law was not a ban on the freedom of association but rather a mere
“time limitation on when they had to act in order to participate in their chosen party’s next
primary.” Id. at 758. Again, based on this language, the Court would have been sympathetic to the
petitioner’s view only if the state law constituted a total ban on First Amendment rights of
association.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 757.
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Justice Power noted in his dissent, “Deferment of a right, especially
one as sensitive and essential as the exercise of the first duty of
citizenship, can be tantamount to its denial.”101 Second, even if one
were to agree with the Court’s conclusion, the Court set a perilous
precedent for determining when a state law infringes on an
individual’s First Amendment associational rights—when the state
law absolutely disenfranchises one or more persons. The Court
followed this precedent in subsequent level-of-support cases. Justice
Powell, dissenting, stressed that the Court had never required a total
ban on voting or associational rights prior to finding a statute
unconstitutional.102
The Court, finding that the law did not impress a heavy burden
on First Amendment rights,103 failed to apply strict scrutiny and
further neglected to identify any standard of review.104 The Court
held that New York’s delayed-enrollment scheme served the state
interest of preventing party “raiding,” “whereby voters in sympathy
with one party designate themselves as voters of another party so as
to influence or determine the results of the other party’s primary.”105

101. Id. at 766.
102. Id. at 766–67.
103. The Court held that the time limitation was not “so severe as itself to constitute an
unconstitutionally onerous burden” on petitioners. Id. at 760. The Court squarely rejected the
petitioners’ arguments that the statute burdened their rights by requiring party enrollment before
potential voters had the requisite knowledge of candidates or issues to be involved in the next
election. Id.
104. Id. at 767.
105. Id. The Court concluded that the prevention of party raiding served to preserve the
integrity of the electoral process, which is a “legitimate and valid state goal.” Id. at 761. The
Court determined that the delayed-enrollment scheme would deter party raiding because if
potential voters were allowed to enroll in a party after the general election, it “would not put the
voter in the unseemly position of asking to be enrolled in one party while at the same time
intending to vote immediately for another.” Id. at 762. Constitutional issues, however, should not
be based on what the Court hypothesizes could be unseemly. See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460
U.S. 780, 789 n.9 (1983) (citing Rosario, 410 U.S. at 752) (upholding restrictions that prevent
“party raiding,” “the organized switching of blocs of voters from one party to another in order to
manipulate the outcome of the other party’s primary election”); Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51,
54–55 (1973). In addition, because the Court failed to apply strict scrutiny, the majority did not
address the question of whether the state’s interest in preventing party raiding could be protected
by less severe measures. Rosario, 410 U.S. at 770. A voter’s failure to comply with this severe
deadline should not be used to support the denial of a fundamental constitutional right. Id. at 765.
As Justice Powell’s dissent noted, “Numerous prior decisions impose on us the obligation to
protect the continuing availability of the franchise for all citizens, not to sanction its prolonged
deferment or deprivation.” Id. at 765 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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4. Storer v. Brown106—The Creation of a New Balancing Test That
Provides Few Protections for Minor Parties
Justice White, a dissenter in Williams, writing for a majority of
the Court in 1974, upheld a California ballot access law. The
provisions of the California Elections Code at issue required that
independent candidates for Congress, president, and vice president
who sought a position on the general election ballot had to:
(1) disaffiliate from political parties (meaning candidates could not
vote for or be registered with a political party) at least one year
before the preceding primary; and (2) file nominating papers signed
by voters totaling at least 5 percent and not more than 6 percent of
the total vote cast in the prior general election in the position for
which the candidates wanted to run.107 The California law required
that the signatures be collected during a twenty-four-day period
occurring after the primary and sixty days before the general
election.108 Those who voted in a partisan primary election could not
sign the nomination papers.109 Candidates failing to meet these
requirements had no opportunity to appear on either state election
ballot.
Instead of relying on the Court’s previous case law addressing
equal protection challenges to provisions of elections laws, Justice
White fashioned a new standard for reviewing such restrictions,
stating that the Court’s rule “provides no litmus-paper test for
separating those restrictions that are valid from those that are
invidious under the Equal Protection Clause.”110 This idea of the
Court having no litmus test to evaluate equal protection claims based
on ballot access restrictions is a theme that runs throughout the
106. 415 U.S. 724 (1974).
107. Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 726 (1974).
108. Id. at 726–27.
109. Id. at 727.
110. Id. at 730. In Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957 (1982), Justice Rehnquist cited to Storer
for the proposition that the Court does not employ a litmus test when analyzing ballot access
restrictions, and that the Court must look to the “facts and circumstances behind the law,” the
State’s interests, and the nature of the interests burdened by the law. Id. at 968. In addition, in
1979, in Illinois State Board of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173 (1979), the
Supreme Court employed the Storer balancing test to strike down a statute, on equal protection
grounds, which required a new party or an independent candidate in Chicago to obtain more
signatures to get a place on the ballot than a party or candidate for statewide office. Id. at 177.
The Court’s decision in Illinois State Board of Elections was based more on the disparity between
the two signature requirements than on the actual merits of the signature-requirement standing
alone.
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Court’s subsequent ballot access cases. This language, oft quoted in
subsequent cases, has in essence allowed the Court to employ an ad
hoc balancing test based on the particular facts underlying each
challenge. This balancing test is particularly problematic in the area
of ballot access restrictions on minor parties where the courts should
employ a searching level of review to restrictions that can clearly
benefit incumbent legislators and that burden the fundamental rights
of voters to vote and associate for the furtherance of common
political beliefs.
While purportedly relying on the Court’s prior decisions, under
the new standard for analyzing ballot access restrictions, the Court
stated that judgment on these issues is “a matter of considering the
facts and circumstances behind the law, the interests which the State
claims to be protecting, and the interests of those who are
disadvantaged by the classification.”111 The Court’s balancing test
leaves a hazardous amount of discretion for a judge’s personal
predilections as to the propriety interests of the state and of those
disadvantaged by the law.
In applying this test, the Storer Court gave great deference to the
balancing test’s state’s-interest prong.112 The Court found that states
have an interest in preventing overcrowded ballots.113 The Court
concluded that California’s one-year disaffiliation provision furthers
the compelling state interest in promoting the stability of the political
system, which outweighed the interest of the candidate and her
supporters in being able to make, as the Court categorized it, a late

111. Storer, 415 U.S. at 723–24 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Dunn v. Blumstein,
405 U.S. 330, 348 (1972)).
112. The Anderson Court, relying on Storer, noted that the rights of voters and candidates to
participate in elections are not absolute and that the states can regulate elections “if they are to be
fair and honest and if some sort of order, rather than chaos, is to accompany the democratic
process.” Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 (1983) (quoting Storer, 415 U.S. at 730).
113. Storer, 415 U.S. at 732 (quoting Bullock v. Cater, 405 U.S. 134, 145 (1972)). The Court
found that an overcrowded ballot could lead to (1) clogging of the election machinery;
(2) confusing the voters; and (3) electing a candidate who is neither the choice of the majority nor
even the plurality. Id. The Court upheld California’s law on the grounds that the route to the
ballot that California laid out for independent candidates was merely an alternative to being
nominated in a party primary. Id. at 733. The Court noted that while independent candidates did
not have to be elected in a primary election, they still had to demonstrate “substantial public
support.” Id.
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decision to obtain a position on the ballot as an independent
candidate.114
The Court applied something far short of strict scrutiny, and
hence never asked if less-drastic means were available to serve the
state’s interest.115 Justice Brennan began his dissent by stating in
emphatic terms that under prior cases, the Court must employ strict
scrutiny, not a balancing test, to determine the validity of laws
regulating candidate access to the ballot.116 Justice Brennan
emphasized that the burden of demonstrating that such a law
survived strict scrutiny was on the state.117 Justice Brennan chastised
the Court’s deferential approach to this ballot access restriction and
found the record devoid of any evidence of the state attempting to
demonstrate “the absence of reasonably less burdensome means of
achieving its objectives.”118
5. American Party of Texas v. White119—The Court’s Erosion of the
Rights of Minor Parties Continues, a Piecemeal
Approach to Evaluating Ballot Access Cases
In 1974 Justice White again wrote for the majority of the Court.
The Court upheld a portion of the Texas Elections Code that
appellants claimed infringed on their First Amendment right of
association and impermissibly discriminated against new and minor
political parties by excluding those groups from general elections in
violation of the Equal Protection Clause.120 Once again, in this case
appellants’ only chance to obtain a position on a state election ballot
was on the general election ballot.
114. Id. at 736. The Court found that states are entitled to limit voters to voting in one
nomination process “to maintain the integrity” of that process. Id. at 741. The Court remanded the
case to the district court to determine if the California laws were reasonable. Id. at 738.
115. Smith, supra note 75, at 188.
116. Storer, 415 U.S. at 756.
117. Justice Brennan also took a markedly different view of the burdens resulting from the
restriction, noting that the California law “absolutely denies ballot position to independent
candidates who, at any time within 12 months prior to the immediately preceding primary
election, were registered as affiliated with a qualified political party.” Id. at 757 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). Justice Brennan found that it was an impermissible burden that independent
candidates affiliated with a recognized political party had to take steps towards candidacy
seventeen months before the election, when “they cannot know either who will be the nominees
of the major parties, or what the significant election issues may be.” Id. at 758.
118. Id. at 761. Justice Brennan found the Court’s purported examination of “less drastic
means” to be “wholly inadequate.” Id. at 760.
119. 415 U.S. 767 (1974).
120. Am. Party of Tex. v. White, 415 U.S. 767 (1974).
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In Texas, there were four ways to nominate candidates for the
general election ballot in addition to writing in the name of a
candidate.121 The political parties that questioned the law in American
Party had to avail themselves of the option open to candidates whose
party’s candidate polled less than 2 percent of the total gubernatorial
vote in the previous general election or whose party did not nominate
a candidate for governor.122 Those candidates could be nominated at
precinct nominating conventions and had to demonstrate the support
of at least 1 percent of the total vote cast for governor in the last
general election.123 If candidates could not show the requisite amount
of support at a nominating convention, the party could circulate
petitions for signatures.124
The Court stated that it applied strict scrutiny and that the ballot
access laws must be “necessary to further compelling state
interests.”125 However, the standard of review employed was, in
reality, far less searching than strict scrutiny. The Court’s analysis
showed little regard for the practical hurdles minor parties face at
nominating conventions or in petition drives. Further, the Court’s
analysis was based on conclusory assertions rather than a factual
record.
The majority found that the state’s compelling interests in
preserving the electoral process’s integrity and avoiding voter
121. First, candidates of political parties whose gubernatorial candidate obtained more than
200,000 votes in the previous general election could only be nominated in the primary election
and were automatically placed on the ballot. Id. at 772. Second, candidates of political parties
whose candidate polled more than 2 percent of the total vote cast for governor in the previous
general election but obtained less than 200,000 votes could be nominated by primary election or
nominating conventions. Id. at 773. Third, nonpartisan or independent candidates could qualify
by filing an application or petition signed by a certain percentage of the votes cast for governor in
the relevant electoral district in the previous general election. Id. at 777.
122. Id. at 774.
123. Id.
124. Id. Under the law there were two ways to satisfy the one-percent-signature requirement.
Id. at 777. First, at the precinct nominating conventions, the party could prepare a list of all of the
convention participants. These participants had to be qualified voters. Id. at 778. Second, if the
party could not get enough signatures at the convention, the party could circulate supplemental
petitions for signature during the fifty-five days after the primary election date (there was a preprimary ban on petition circulation). Id. Only voters who did not participate in another party’s
primary election or nominating process could sign the petition. Id. Signatories were required to
sign an oath that had to be notarized. Id. The political parties challenged a number of provisions,
including (1) the one-percent-support requirement; (2) the pre-primary ban on petition circulation;
(3) the requirement that all voters who sign the petition did not participate in another party’s
nominating process; (4) the fifty-five-day limitation on obtaining signatures; and (5) and the
notarization requirement. Id. at 779.
125. Id. at 780.
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confusion by limiting the number of candidates on the ballot were
sufficient to uphold the restrictions.126 The Court, however, failed to
engage in an analysis as to whether the electoral process’s integrity
would be harmed, or whether voters would be confused, without the
restrictions at issue. Further, the Court failed to discuss the
availability of less-burdensome alternatives.127
The Court set an unreasonably high bar for the type of ballot
access law that would pose an impermissible restriction. Justice
White cautioned that ballot access restrictions “may not be so
excessive or impractical as to be in reality a mere device to always,
or almost always, exclude parties with significant support from the
ballot.”128 While this may appear to be a limiting principle, in effect
Justice White proclaimed that ballot access laws are constitutionally
valid so long as they do not “always, or almost always” bar parties
with nonfrivolous support from appearing on the ballot.
As compared to the totality-of-the-circumstances approach taken
by the Williams Court, the American Party Court, like the Jenness
Court, parsed through each of the petitioner’s challenged sections
separately to determine whether it, alone, was constitutional.129 This
approach greatly increases the chances that a scheme will pass
muster, as each provision taken separately may not be unduly
burdensome, but all the provisions as a whole may pose an
unreasonable restriction.
Justice Douglas, in a short opinion, concluded that “the totality
of the requirements imposed upon minority parties works an

126. Id. at 782.
127. The Court concluded that the Texas law did not discriminate against smaller parties by
requiring that they nominate their candidates through party conventions rather than primary
elections. Id. The Court found that there was no evidence that party conventions were
“invidiously more burdensome” than primary elections. Id. Again, it is unclear what the Court’s
conclusions were based on.
128. Id. at 783 (emphasis added).
129. For instance, as to the one-percent-support requirement, the Court concluded that the
requirement, which in 1972 was the equivalent of 22,000 votes, “falls within the outer boundaries
of support the State may require before according political parties ballot position.” Id. at 782. The
Court also accorded some weight to the fact that two political parties had qualified for the general
election under the challenged provision. Further, as to the requirement that supplemental
signatures be gathered in fifty-five days, the Court found that this was not an unduly short time
for circulating the supplemental petitions. In addition, with respect to the requirement that those
who signed the supplemental petition sign an oath, which had to be notarized, the Court relied on
the district court ruling, which “found no alternative if the State was to be able to enforce its laws
to prevent voters from crossing over or from voting twice for the same office.” Id. at 787.
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invidious and unconstitutional discrimination.”130 Justice Douglas’s
approach stood in stark contrast to the majority’s. Again, the
majority parsed through each provision of the Texas law to
determine whether it, in isolation, passed constitutional muster, and
only then concluded that taken as a whole the law was permissible.
Justice Douglas, in contrast, followed the approach elucidated in
Williams and took into account the overall burdens that the Texas
law placed on candidates and parties.
6. Anderson v. Celebrezze131—The Court Creates Another
Balancing Test to Analyze Ballot Access Restrictions
In Anderson v. Celebrezze—a case addressing early-filing
deadlines—the Court articulated its current test for analyzing ballot
access restrictions (at least those that do not pose severe burdens).132
While not a level-of-support case, the decision informs the Court’s
level-of-support case law. In 1983, nine years after Justice White laid
out the Storer balancing test, the Court appeared to clarify that test in
Anderson.

130. Id. at 797 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part) (emphasis added).
131. 460 U.S. 780 (1983).
132. Id. at 787–89. The Anderson balancing test is utilized in a number of different ballotrelated situations. Employing the Anderson balancing test, Justice Marshall, writing for a majority
of the Court in 1986 in Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut, 479 U.S. 208 (1986), struck
down Connecticut’s closed-primary statute on First Amendment grounds. Id. at 211. Under a
1956 Connecticut law, voters in any political party primary had to be registered members of that
party. Id. at 210. In 1984, the Republican Party of Connecticut enacted a party rule that allowed
independent voters to vote in Republican primaries for federal and statewide offices. Id. The
Republican Party claimed that Connecticut’s 1956 law infringed on its First Amendment “right to
freedom of association for the advancement of common political objectives.” Id. at 213. The
Court rejected, as either insufficient or not implicated, the three state interests that the state
argued justified the 1956 law. First, the Court addressed the state interest in avoiding party
raiding. Id. at 219. While acknowledging that this interest was found to be sufficient in Rosario,
the Court found that the interest was “not implicated” by the Connecticut statute. Second, the
Court addressed the state interest in avoiding voter confusion. Id. While acknowledging the
legitimacy of this interest, as evidenced by its decision in Anderson, the Court cited to Anderson
and stated that “[o]ur cases reflect a greater faith in the ability of individual voters to inform
themselves about campaign issues.” Id. at 220. Third, the Court addressed the state interest in the
protection of the integrity of the two-party system. Id. at 222. The Court found that it was not its
role to determine whether the state legislature acted wisely in passing the 1956 law, or if the
Republican Party made a sage decision in trying to depart from that law. The Court
acknowledged that it upheld the sufficiency of that interest in Storer and Rosario, but held that
those regulations “imposed certain burdens upon the protected First and Fourteenth Amendment
interests of some individuals, both voters and potential candidates in order to protect the interests
of others. In the present case, the state statute is defended on the ground that it protects the
integrity of the Party against the Party itself.” Id. at 224.
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Anderson dictates, as Storer did, that courts balance the burdens
that ballot restrictions place on minor parties against the state’s
interest in implementing those restrictions. First, courts must
“consider the character and magnitude” of the plaintiff’s asserted
injury to her First Amendment rights.133 Second, a court “must
identify and evaluate the precise interests put forward by the State as
justifications for the burden imposed by its rule.”134 The Court in
Anderson cautioned that, in weighing these two interests, a court
“must not only determine the legitimacy and strength of each of
those interests; it also must consider the extent to which those
interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff’s rights.”135 This
balancing test appears to impose a level of judicial review close to
intermediate scrutiny.
Applying this test to the Ohio law at issue, which required
independent presidential candidates to file a statement of candidacy
and nominating petition in March to appear on the November general
election ballot, Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, found that
Ohio’s early filing deadline failed to pass constitutional muster.136
Despite its application of a balancing test, Anderson represents a
temporary return of the Court’s protection of ballot access for minorparty candidates. Anderson demonstrates that the Court need not
employ strict scrutiny in order to strike down laws hostile to the
rights of independent candidates and third parties. Subsequent levelof-support cases, however, employ Anderson while misunderstanding minor parties’ role in political campaigns.
7. Munro v. Socialist Workers Party137—The Court Finds That
Access to Any Statewide Ballot Is Enough
Justice White, writing for a majority of the Court in 1986,
upheld a Washington statute that required that minor-party
candidates running for partisan offices receive at least 1 percent of
133. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 780.
134. Id. at 789.
135. Id.
136. First, with respect to the plaintiffs’ asserted injury, the Court found that Ohio’s early
filing deadline “places a particular burden on an identifiable segment of Ohio’s independentminded voters.” Id. at 792. Second, the Court found that the interests put forward by the state
were not sufficient to uphold the restriction. The Court identified three interests—voter education,
equal treatment for partisan and independent candidates, and political stability—each of which
the Court found to be insufficient. Id. at 796.
137. 479 U.S. 189 (1986).
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votes cast in the primary election in order for their names to appear
on the general election ballot.138 In Munro v. Socialist Workers Party,
the Court upheld the requirements as applied to candidates for
statewide offices in light of the state’s interest in restricting access to
the general election ballot.139
While the Court’s holding may be narrow, its analysis is
dangerously deferential to state legislatures. The Court, applying the
Storer and Anderson balancing tests, required very little of the state
in the way of proffering an interest sufficient to outweigh the burden
this restriction placed on First Amendment rights.140 The Court noted,
“We have never required a State to make a particularized showing of
the existence of voter confusion, ballot overcrowding, or the
presence of frivolous candidacies prior to the imposition of
reasonable restrictions on ballot access.”141 The Court found that
putting the burden of proof on the state would lead to “endless court
battles over the sufficiency of the ‘evidence’ marshaled by a State to
prove the predicate.”142 Put another way, the state need only claim
that its restriction serves to promote the “integrity of the political
process” without actually proffering any proof.143

138. Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189, 191 (1986).
139. Id. at 193.
140. Id. at 194 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788 n.9).
141. Id. at 194–95.
142. Id. at 195.
143. The Court found it sufficient that the record “suggest[ed]” that the statute was related to
the “legislature’s perception that the general election ballot was becoming cluttered with
candidates from minor parties who did not command significant voter support.” Id. at 196
(emphasis added). The Court cited to evidence that the year before the law was enacted, the
largest number of minor parties in Washington’s history appeared on the general election ballot.
Id. In and of itself, this should not have been sufficient to cause the Court to uphold a statute that
impinged on the fundamental rights to associate and cast a ballot effectively. With respect to the
State’s interest, the Court concluded that Washington was “clearly entitled to raise the ante for
ballot access, to simplify the general election ballot, and to avoid the possibility of unrestrained
factionalism at the general election.” Id. at 189 (emphasis added). The problem, as Justice
Marshall pointed out in his dissent, is that while Washington’s law may reduce overcrowding of
the general election ballot, it does so at the expense of the primary election ballot. Id. at 203
(Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall, in his dissent, stated that “[t]he statute streamlines the
general election, where overcrowding and confusion appear never to have been much of a
problem before the [law was passed], at the expense of an already cumbersome primary ballot.”
The Court, therefore, upheld a law that “exacerbates the very problem it claims to solve.” Id. at
204. Under this scenario, the law at issue does not even pass a rational basis level of scrutiny. Id.
Justice Marshall powerfully stated, “The Court evidently deems legitimate the State’s decision to
befuddle the voters in the only election that now matters to minor-party candidates and their
adherents in order to guarantee a negligible increase in ballot clarity at the general election.” Id.

Winter 2011]

IS THE PARTY OVER?

495

Though the Court demonstrated great deference to the state’s
proffered interests, the Court’s holding likely hinged on the fact that
under Washington’s law candidates had access to the primary ballot,
and the only question was access to the general election ballot.144
This is the crux of the problem presented by Proposition 14: under
that proposition, candidates who prefer to affiliate with minor parties
that are not ballot qualified may be prevented from listing their party
preference on any ballot.
In applying the balancing test, the Court failed to articulate a
level of scrutiny.145 Instead, the Court merely stated that the
government’s interests were sufficient, and the First Amendment
rights at issue were not strong enough to overcome those interests.
The Court, therefore, simply balanced the two competing interests
and found that the state’s interest was greater than the minor parties’
First Amendment interests.146
The Court’s balancing of the interests, however, seems improper
even under Anderson. The Court gave undue credence to the state’s
interest and short shrift to burdens imposed on the First Amendment
rights of minor parties and their candidates. This case, therefore,
demonstrates the dangers of the Anderson balancing test. The Court
should apply strict scrutiny to ballot access restrictions infringing on
a minor party candidate’s ability to list her party preference on a
ballot. There is a great danger of abuse when the legislature, which is
dominated by members of the major parties, makes laws that restrict
minor-party members’ ability to compete in elections.147
144. Id. at 199 (majority opinion). The Munro Court found that “[i]t can hardly be said that
Washington’s voters are denied freedom of association because they must channel their
expressive activity into a campaign at the primary as opposed to the general election.” Id. Indeed,
“[c]entral to the Court’s holding was an equating of the primary ballot with the general election
ballot.” Smith, supra note 75, at 191.
145. Munro, 479 U.S. at 200 (Marshall, J., dissenting). In his dissent, Justice Marshall stated,
“The Court fails to articulate the level of scrutiny it applies in holding that the Washington one
percent primary vote requirement is not an unconstitutional ballot access restriction.” Id. at 200.
146. The Court wholly failed to address whether the law is properly tailored to serve the
state’s interest. Id. at 203. In his dissent, Justice Marshall stated, “It still remains for the State to
demonstrate that the statute is ‘properly drawn,’ employing the ‘least drastic means’ to achieve
the State’s ends.” Id. The law is narrowly tailored only to protect members of major parties from
competition from minor parties on the general election ballot. Id. at 205. Justice Marshall stated,
“The only purpose this statute seems narrowly tailored to advance is the impermissible one of
protecting the major political parties from competition precisely when that competition would be
most meaningful.” Id. This approach leaves the lower courts with very little direction, but broad
discretion.
147. Id. at 201 (“The necessity for this approach becomes evident when we consider that
major parties, which by definition are ordinarily in control of legislative institutions, may seek to
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C. Filing-Fee Cases—The Court’s Consistent Approach to
Economic Barriers to Ballot Access
The Court’s rulings on laws requiring filing fees in order to
obtain ballot qualification shed light on those cases dealing with the
issue addressed in this Article—ballot qualification based on
participation, registration, or petition signatures. In two seminal
filing-fee cases, Bullock v. Cartner148 and Lubin v. Panish,149 both
authored by Chief Justice Burger, the Court acknowledged that a
candidate’s ability to pay a filing fee has little to do with that
candidate’s ability to be elected, whereas level-of-support
requirements can demonstrate whether a candidate is a viable
contender.150
The filing-fee cases help to inform the current inquiry because
they (1) elucidate the Court’s expansive view of what a sufficiently
important state interest is (both cases focus on the states’ interest in
restricting the size of the ballot); and (2) demonstrate the Court’s
failure to define or apply a consistent standard of review to ballot
access restrictions.
For instance, in 1972 in Bullock, the Court found that a Texas
filing-fee law must be “closely scrutinized” and that it must be
“reasonably necessary” to accomplish a legitimate state interest
because the impact on the “exercise of the franchise” was “real and
appreciable.”151 It is not clear what level of scrutiny the Court
employed in analyzing this restriction. The Court appeared to employ
something short of strict scrutiny, which requires a compelling state
interest to which the law at issue must be narrowly tailored.
With respect to the state’s interest, Chief Justice Burger
recognized that the state had a “legitimate interest in regulating the

perpetuate themselves at the expense of developing minor parties. The application of strict
scrutiny to ballot access restrictions ensures that measures taken to further a State’s interest in
keeping frivolous candidates off the ballot do not incidentally impose an impermissible bar to
minor-party access.”).
148. 405 U.S. 134 (1972).
149. 415 U.S. 709 (1974).
150. The Court’s filing-fee case law addresses restrictions that prevent a candidate’s access to
the primary election ballot, while, as stated, the Court’s level-of-support case law primarily deals
with restrictions that prevent a candidate’s access to the general election ballot. The cases are,
however, analogous because in both situations, the Court has reviewed restrictions that would
prevent a candidate’s only ability to appear on a statewide ballot.
151. Bullock, 405 U.S. at 144.
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number of candidates on the ballot.”152 The Court found that the state
properly wished to “prevent the clogging of its election machinery,
avoid voter confusion, and assure that the winner is the choice of a
majority, or at least a strong plurality, of those voting, without the
expense and burden of runoff elections.”153 These are the same
interests the Court discussed when addressing ballot access
restrictions based on participation, registration, or signatures.
In addition, in 1974 in Lubin, the Supreme Court struck down a
California filing-fee statute.154 The Court again discussed the state’s
interest in limiting the number of candidates on a ballot for the same
reasons laid out in Bullock.155
Chief Justice Burger, apparently without engaging in any
empirical investigation, stated, “That ‘laundry list’ ballots discourage
voter participation and confuse and frustrate those who do participate
is too obvious to call for extended discussion.”156 Chief Justice
Burger further asserted, without support, that “[r]ational results
within the framework of our system are not likely to be reached if the
ballot for a single office must list a dozen or more aspirants who are
relatively unknown or have no prospects of success.”157 The Court
worried that if the ballot listed too many candidates, the winner
would not represent the majority’s will. Without any empirical
evidence, the Court’s assertions are conclusory.
Further, the Court once again failed to elucidate a standard of
review. The Court appeared to apply an “undue burden” standard,
stating that the state’s interest “must be achieved by a means that
does not unfairly or unnecessarily burden either a minority party’s or
an individual candidate’s equally important interest in the continued
availability of political opportunity.”158
152. Id. at 145.
153. The Court found that the law failed for lack of tailoring, stating that if the law was
designed to “regulate the ballot by weeding out spurious candidates, it is extraordinarily ill-fitted
to that goal.” Id. at 146.
154. Lubin, 415 U.S. 709. The Court struck down the law as a violation of equal protection
rights, finding that it was not appropriate to determine the seriousness of a candidate based solely
on that candidate’s ability to pay a filing fee. Id. at 716.
155. Id. at 712–13 (citations omitted).
156. Id. at 715.
157. Id. at 715–16.
158. Id. at 716. Justice Rehnquist, writing for a plurality in Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957
(1982), cited to Lubin for the principle that “[t]he inquiry is whether the challenged restriction
unfairly or unnecessarily burdens the ‘availability of political opportunity.’” Id. at 964 (quoting
Lubin, 415 U.S. at 716)).
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III. WHAT HAVE THE LOWER COURTS SAID
ABOUT SIMILAR RESTRICTIONS?
It is no surprise that lower courts, bound to rely on the Supreme
Court’s thinking, have, with only one exception, failed to properly
weigh the benefits and burdens of restrictions on a candidate’s ability
to designate her preferred party on the ballot.
At first glance, the weight of the lower court case law appears to
indicate that it is permissible to prevent a candidate from designating
her party preference and that therefore Proposition 14 is likely to be
found constitutional. However, when one delves into the specifics of
the lower court case law, it is clear that a number of the cases
upholding the validity of such prohibitions are distinguishable from
the present issue.159
A. Do Candidates Have a Right to List
Themselves as “Independent”?
Socialist Workers Party v. March Fong Eu160 was the first case
to address the issues of whether candidates have a right to list their
party designation on a ballot and whether voters have a right to be
informed of candidates’ party affiliations.161 There the Ninth Circuit
upheld a California Elections Code provision that provided that
candidates of political parties that were qualified to participate in
California’s primary election would be designated by their party
affiliation on the general election ballot, while candidates qualifying
for the general election ballot through an independent-petition
procedure would merely be identified as “Independent.”162
159. While at first blush seeming to provide guidance on the instant issue, a Tenth Circuit
decision upholding an Oklahoma statute that provided that only recognized parties could identify
their candidate on the ballot with a party label is also not on point. Rainbow Coal. v. Okla. State
Election Bd., 844 F.2d 740 (10th Cir. 1988). There, the law provided that
[a] political body desiring to obtain recognized party status must file petitions with the
Board bearing the signatures of registered voters equal to at least five percent (5%) of
the total votes cast in the last General Election either for Governor or for electors for
President and Vice President. The party has one year to circulate the petitions, and
must file them no later than May 31 of an even-numbered year.
Id. at 741–42 (internal quotation marks omitted). The court applied the Anderson balancing test
and rested its holding on “the administrative burden on the state that would result from permitting
designation of minority party affiliation . . . .” Id. at 747. This finding rested on the lack of
computer technology available in Oklahoma. Id. Now, of course, that is no longer the case.
160. 591 F.2d 1252 (9th Cir. 1978).
161. Id. at 1260.
162. Id. In California, political parties could qualify on a statewide basis only to participate in
any primary election if
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The court recognized that the law “has possible effects on both
associational and voting rights,” “fail[s] to inform voters fully[,] and
possibly can contribute to misunderstanding by some voters.”163
However, the court—assuming for the sake of argument that the law
affected fundamental rights and heavily relied on Supreme Court
case law—found that the provision did not impose a substantial
burden and hence failed to apply strict scrutiny.
The court’s ruling is distinguishable from the issue presented in
this Article because the holding rested in large part on the fact that
candidates did in fact have a party designation—Independent. The
court found that “‘Independent’ has a clear meaning in the context of
California ballot qualification procedure.”164 The court specifically
distinguished the California law from one that would prevent the use
of a party name, which is the situation this Article addresses.165 There
is, therefore, no indication that the Ninth Circuit would have upheld
the restrictions if candidates could not list any designation. Hence Eu
should not be used to support the validity of California’s current
electoral scheme.
Similarly, the 1992 Sixth Circuit decision Rosen v. Brown166 is
also not directly on point. However, the court’s rationale in that case
can and should be applied by the lower courts and the Supreme Court
when they are faced with the issue raised by this Article—whether
certain candidates can list their party affiliation on the ballot. In
Rosen, the court struck down a law that prohibited a nonparty
candidate from having the ballot designation “Independent” on the
general election ballot if that candidate obtained a position on the
ballot as a result of a nominating petition.167
Relying on expert testimony, the Sixth Circuit struck down the
law, finding that “party identification is the single most important
(1) any of its candidates in the last gubernatorial election for statewide office receive at
least two percent of the vote; (2) 135 days before the primary election, the party
possessed registration equal to one percent of the entire vote of the state in the last
gubernatorial election; or (3) 135 days before the primary election voters equal to ten
percent of the entire vote at the last gubernatorial election sign a petition in support of
qualification of the party.
Id. at 1254–55.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 1261.
165. Id. at 1262.
166. 970 F.2d 169 (6th Cir. 1992).
167. Id.
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influence on political opinions and voting.”168 The court correctly
found that “[w]ithout a designation next to an Independent’s name on
the ballot, the voter has no clue as to what the candidate stands
for.”169 This finding applies with additional force to a candidate
without any designation next to her name.
The court applied the Anderson balancing test. In evaluating the
plaintiffs’ injury, the court cited to a 1983 Eleventh Circuit case,
Dart v. Brown,170 discussed below, where the court acknowledged
that a candidate’s lack of party affiliation on the ballot could impair a
voter’s right to cast a meaningful vote or meaningfully associate, but
it also found that no evidence pointed to those conclusions.171 The
Rosen court concluded that there was such evidence before it in the
form of expert testimony.172 The court held that “the State infringes
upon the right of supporters of Independent candidates to
meaningfully vote and meaningfully associate by providing a ‘voting
cue’ to Democratic and Republican candidates which makes it
virtually impossible for Independent candidates to prevail in the
general election.”173
With respect to the state’s-interest prong of the Anderson
analysis, the court found that Ohio’s interests in “minimizing ballotgenerated voter confusion and in producing a manageable ballot”
were “specious” and represented Ohio’s “deliberate attempt” to
ensure the success of the major-party candidates.174 The court was
suspicious of Ohio’s claim that it was helping the voters to make
wise decisions by restricting the amount of information voters could
receive.175 It is indeed a strange tactic to argue that voters should
obtain less information about candidates on the ballot in order to
reduce voter confusion. The court also correctly found that Ohio did
168. Id. at 172. Another expert also explained why the lack of party affiliation can be vitally
important for minor-party candidates, stating that “party candidates are afforded a ‘voting cue’ on
the ballot in the form of a party label which research indicates is the most significant determinant
of voting behavior.” Id.
169. Id. The court further found that “the state affords a crucial advantage to party candidates
by allowing them to use a designation, while denying the Independent the crucial opportunity to
communicate a designation of their candidacy.” Id.
170. 717 F.2d 1491 (11th Cir. 1983).
171. Rosen, 970 F.2d at 176.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 177.
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not produce a shorter or more manageable ballot by omitting “voting
cues.”176
B. The Court Addresses Restrictions Preventing
Candidates from Listing Their Party Affiliations
Dart v. Brown, a 1983 Eleventh Circuit decision, is on point and
addresses the same issue this Article raises. However, the court,
relying in large part on the Supreme Court’s flawed reasoning,
underestimated the burdens such laws place on the voters and
overestimated the state’s interest in enacting a portion of the
Louisiana Election Code. The code provided that candidates
affiliated with unrecognized political parties could only designate
themselves as “not affiliated with a recognized political party” or
“NP” (for no recognized party).177 Louisiana, like California, held
open-primary elections.178 In Dart, appellants unsuccessfully
mounted an equal protection challenge, contending that the
distinction Louisiana made between recognized and unrecognized
parties was impermissible, and a First Amendment challenge,
claiming that the law impermissibly burdened their rights to
meaningfully vote and associate.179
The court, relying on Supreme Court case law, failed to apply
strict scrutiny.180 The court found a distinction between Supreme
Court cases that address restrictions preventing candidates’ names
from appearing on the ballot and the issue at bar, laws preventing
candidates from listing a party designation.181 The court held that the
two constitutional rights identified in Anderson, the right to cast a
meaningful vote and the right of voters to associate for the
advancement of their political beliefs, were not “invaded in a case of
this kind—the voters had a full choice of candidates . . . .”182
The court’s conclusion rested on the following findings:
176. Id.
177. Dart v. Brown, 717 F.2d 1491, 1492 (11th Cir. 1983). In Louisiana, a political party was
recognized if “one of its candidates for presidential elector received at least five percent of the
votes cast in this state for presidential electors in the last presidential election, or if at least five
percent of the registered voters in the state are registered as being affiliated with the political
party.” Id. at 1495.
178. Id. at 1494.
179. Id. at 1498.
180. Id. at 1499.
181. Id.
182. Id.
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Although the words “Libertarian Party” did not appear
under [Appellant] Dart’s name, the Libertarian Party was
not denied access to the ballot. The ballot’s only
significance was in electing candidates. It was a candidate,
not a party, ballot . . . . As Dart was granted access to the
ballot, so was the Libertarian Party.183
The court’s rationale is flawed for a number of reasons. First, the
Libertarian Party was denied access to the ballot.184 Its name
appeared nowhere on the ballot, and many, if not most, voters would
not know that the appellant, Dart, was affiliated with that party.185 As
the court found in Rosen, party affiliation is the most important cue a
voter can receive. Dart’s access to the ballot is simply not the same
as the Libertarian Party’s access to the ballot.
Second, ballots have significance beyond electing candidates.
Ballots and elections give voters the chance to cast a meaningful vote
for the candidate and party of their choosing—and allow voters to
meaningfully associate with likeminded people—which includes the
right to support the party of their choosing.
In sum, though the court’s conclusory assertions were to the
contrary, the right to effectively vote and the right to associate for the
advancement of political beliefs were both burdened (and not just
minimally so) by this restriction. Therefore, the court should have
applied strict scrutiny.186 While the court believed that “[t]here was
no denial of the right to have the candidate of one’s choice on the
ballot or to vote for such candidate,”187 this finding flies in the face of
common sense and practical experience. Many voters do not
encounter the candidates until they see their names in the ballot
box.188 Further, a large percentage of voters make their decisions not
based on a candidate’s name but on her party affiliation.189 The
court’s conclusion makes sense only in an idealized world where
voters are aware and educated as to each candidate’s party affiliation.
Hence, while a party’s candidate may appear on an electoral ballot,
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1498.
Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992).
Dart, 717 F.2d at 1501.
See Rosen v. Brown, 970 F.2d 169, 175 (6th Cir. 1992)
See id. at 172.
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this Article argues that without a party designation the party is for all
intents and purposes denied access to the ballot.
The court, in fact, seems almost to acknowledge as much. The
court found that “perhaps” the restriction “diminishes the
[appellant’s] chances of success in any given election.”190 The court
noted that if that were true, “the lack of party designation might
arguably be said to impair the ability to cast a meaningful vote, or to
meaningfully associate for the enhancement of political beliefs.”191
The court, however, failed to give credence to that argument, instead
finding a lack of “evidence[,] literature or facts of common
knowledge” supporting that proposition.192
The court’s rationale rested in part on the fact that Louisiana had
and continues to have an open-primary system similar to the one
created by Proposition 14.193 The court found that this electoral
structure watered down claims that the law stood on constitutionally
infirm grounds. An open-primary system means that a candidate’s
party affiliation on the ballot does not indicate that the party selected
or supports the candidate.194 The court found that candidates who are
unable to designate their party affiliation are therefore not seen as
lacking party support or having less party support than other
candidates.195 The court concluded that a ballot in an open-primary
system “is a candidate ballot, the only significance of which is the
election of individual candidates, not party nominees as such.”196
The court’s rationale, however, misses the point. As the Sixth
Circuit found, “[m]any voters do not know who the candidates are or
who they will vote for until they enter the voting booth. Without a
label, voters cannot identify the nonparty candidates or know what
they represent.”197 When candidates are prevented from listing their
party affiliation, the burden on voters is real, regardless of whether
190. Dart, 717 F.2d at 1505.
191. Id.
192. Id. The Sixth Circuit in Rosen v. Brown cited to this language in the court’s decision and
found that “such evidence does appear in the record before this court in the form of the affidavits
from plaintiffs’ three expert witnesses.” Rosen, 970 F.2d at 176.
193. Dart, 717 F.2d at 1494. However, in Louisiana, a general or runoff election would only
occur in the event that one of the top two vote-getters did not get a majority of the votes. Id. at
1495.
194. Id. at 1505.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Rosen, 970 F.2d at 172 (citing expert testimony for the proposition).
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the primaries are open or closed. Again, the court appeared to see the
errors of its ways by acknowledging that “[p]erhaps over a period of
time a ‘minor’ party would benefit from the ‘exposure’ attendant to
having its name appear on the ballot, but this is wholly
speculative.”198
With respect to the state’s interest, the court found that interest
to be avoidance of “confusion” or “deception” on the ballot.199 The
court acknowledged that this interest is typically implicated where
the question is whether a candidate can appear on the ballot, not
whether a candidate can designate her party affiliation.200 However,
the court concluded that the potential for voter confusion and
deception exists where there are no restrictions on what constitutes a
political party for ballot-designation purposes.201 Simply put, the
court is wrong. Washington State, which also has an open-primary,
top-two election system, disagrees. There, candidates can list any
party affiliation they choose.202 Voting cues are important, whether
candidates run in open or closed primaries, as this leads to
information, not confusion. The fear of confusion and deception
seems greater in a system where voters are denied information, as
opposed to one in which misuse of information is possible.
In rejecting the appellant’s argument that there is no need for
certain candidates to list their party designation on the ballot, the
court ironically elucidated the very reasons that it is important for all
candidates to be able to list their party affiliation. The court
concluded that “the fact that Louisiana’s electoral scheme gives no
formal or structural significance to party nomination or endorsement
tends to increase, rather than decrease, the need for some ballot
information concerning party affiliation.”203 While the court did not
extend this logic to all candidates’ ability to list their party affiliation,
regardless of the level of support that party obtained, the court’s
rationale should certainly apply to such an argument.
A 2001 Sixth Circuit decision also addresses the issue discussed
in this Article. Like the Eleventh Circuit’s rationale in Dart almost
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.

Dart, 717 F.2d at 1505.
Id. at 1508.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1509.
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twenty years earlier, the Sixth Circuit relied on faulty assumptions in
Supreme Court cases to uphold the same provision struck down in
Rosen.204 In Schrader v. Blackwell,205 an Ohio law prevented a ballotqualified candidate from listing his party affiliation with the
Libertarian Party on the ballot because the party was not ballot
qualified.206 The Schrader court noted that while Ohio reenacted the
provision struck down in Rosen, it complied with the dictates of that
case by asking candidates who obtained ballot access through the
independent-petition procedure if they wanted to be listed as an
Independent.207 Because Schrader obtained ballot access through the
independent-petition procedure, he was placed on the ballot as an
independent candidate.208
The court employed the Anderson balancing test, finding that the
restriction was not so severe as to trigger strict scrutiny.209 With
respect to the plaintiff’s injury, it was the district court that correctly
determined that “the associational interests of Schrader and the
Libertarian Party of Ohio to obtain a ballot cue were even stronger
than those of independent candidates, because Schrader actually
represents a specific ideology that he would like to have conveyed
through a voting cue on the ballot.”210 The Sixth Circuit, however,
relying on Storer, found a difference between the roles of
independent candidates and political parties such that the law
presented a minimal injury to Schrader and the Libertarian Party.
As to the state’s interest, the court gave credence to the
plaintiff’s specious claims that “denying party labels to candidates of
unqualified political parties minimizes voter confusion, prevents
voter deception, and promotes political stability.”211 The court’s
conclusion rested on the belief that allowing candidates who
obtained ballot access through the independent-petition procedure to
designate their chosen party affiliation would deny Ohio the right to
regulate the formation of political parties.212 This analysis ignores the
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.

Schrader v. Blackwell, 241 F.3d 783 (6th Cir. 2001).
241 F.3d 783.
Id. at 784.
Id. at 785.
Id. at 786.
Id. at 788.
Id. at 789 (emphasis added).
Id.
Id. at 790.
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state’s interest in providing voters with vital information about
candidates.
In sum, the court found that Rosen was distinguishable, buying
the plaintiff’s argument that “the state’s interests in regulating
political-party candidates is inherently greater than its interests in
regulating independent candidates.”213 The opposite, however, is true
for the reasons articulated by the district court.
Hence, only Dart and Schrader address the issue this Article
presents. Those cases, relying on faulty assumptions dictated by the
Supreme Court, failed to acknowledge the burdens such restrictions
place on voters’ abilities to meaningfully cast a ballot and associate
with others for the advancement of their common beliefs. Further,
the court illogically gave credence to states’ specious claims that
denying voters the most important voting cue they can receive serves
to prevent voter confusion and deception.
IV. THE COURT SHOULD APPLY STRICT SCRUTINY TO
CALIFORNIA’S BALLOT ACCESS RESTRICTIONS
The Supreme Court should employ heightened judicial review to
ballot access restrictions. Currently the Court applies the Anderson
balancing test to “reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions,” while
the Court applies strict scrutiny to “severe restrictions.”214 Hence the
determination as to whether a restriction is “severe” often dictates
whether it will be upheld.
This Article argues that courts should apply strict scrutiny to
ballot access restrictions that prevent a candidate from listing her
party preference. First, such restrictions address the fundamental
rights to meaningfully cast a vote and to associate with others for the
furtherance of one’s political beliefs. These rights stand at the very
core of our democracy. Given the weight of the interests at issue, the
Court should require more of the states than merely demonstrating
that their interests are “generally sufficient to justify the
restrictions.”215
Second, logic dictates that ballot access restrictions, such as the
one addressed in this Article, give rise to equal protection concerns

213. Id. at 787.
214. Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992).
215. Id. (citing Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 (1983)).
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and are in fact implemented for “discriminatory” reasons.216 These
restrictions, which burden members of minor parties, are passed by
members of the legislature who are overwhelmingly members of the
major parties.217 Heightened judicial review is necessary where, as in
this case, incumbent legislators may act to insulate themselves from
challengers.218 Simply stated, “[i]ncumbent politicians of the two
major political parties generally can agree on at least one thing—the
desirability of keeping new parties and independent candidates off
the ballot through burdensome access restrictions.”219 State
legislatures, facing little scrutiny by the Supreme Court, have an
opportunity to ward off would-be challengers by implementing ballot
access restrictions burdening minor parties.220
In sum, both because fundamental rights are at play and because
the legislature’s motives should be heavily scrutinized, the Court
should employ strict scrutiny to ballot access restrictions, which
burden minor parties by preventing candidates from listing their
party affiliation. When applying strict scrutiny the Court should take
a holistic view as to how a restriction operates to burden the rights of
candidates and voters instead of parsing through a law, provision by
provision.

216. “States should not be allowed to discriminate against minor parties to favor the two-party
system unless they can put forward more evidence of the system’s benefits than the last
generation of political scientists has been able to do.” Richard L. Hasen, Do the Parties or the
People Own the Electoral Process?, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 815, 826 (2001).
217. Id. at 838–39 (“Courts should scrutinize these requirements carefully because the
legislature that passes them is made up almost entirely of Democrats and Republicans, who have
a common interest in maintaining high barriers to entry by other parties.”).
218. Evseev, supra note 45, at 1279.
219. Michael J. Klarman, Majoritarian Judicial Review: The Entrenchment Problem, 85 GEO.
L.J. 491, 521 (1997). Klarman further stated,
To compound the entrenchment problem, not only do incumbents have something to
gain by restricting outsider competition; [but] they [also] may have little to lose. If
incumbents of both major political parties share a self-interested commitment to
imposing onerous ballot access restrictions, how are dissatisfied voters to express their
frustration at the polls? The only candidates on the ballot, by hypothesis, have
endorsed the restrictions. The Supreme Court on several occasions has explicitly
acknowledged that ballot access restrictions warrant close judicial scrutiny because of
the potential they create for incumbent self-dealing.
Id. at 522.
220. Evseev, supra note 45, at 1284; Winger, supra note 48, at 237.
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A. The Governmental Interests at Issue Are Weak
In applying strict scrutiny, the Court should first look to whether
there is a compelling state interest to justify the restriction on
fundamental rights. This Article argues that this will rarely be the
case.221 The days of the Court’s wholesale acceptance of states’
conclusory and self-serving assertions related to their enacted ballot
access restrictions should be over. The Court must conduct a much
more searching review of states’ asserted interests.
Further, regardless of the standard of review employed, as the
following demonstrates, California’s election laws do not even
implicate many of the states’ proffered interests—here the question
is not whether candidates will appear on the ballot but whether they
will be able to list their party affiliation.222 The Court’s rulings
generally rest on a few asserted state interests, which in addition to
the broad and amorphous assertion of promoting the integrity of the
political and electoral processes,223 include (1) preventing frivolous
or fraudulent candidacies,224 (2) avoiding an overcrowded ballot that
could lead to voter confusion,225 (3) avoiding the cost and burden of
runoff elections,226 (4) avoiding party raiding,227 and (5) ensuring that
the winner of the election was the choice of at least a strong plurality,
if not a majority, of the voters.228
The first three interests are not implicated by California’s ballot
access laws. First, as to the prevention of frivolous candidacies, these
221. See Hasen, supra note 216, at 838 (“[T]he government rarely has a legitimate, much less
compelling, reason to place onerous burdens on minor parties.”).
222. In addition, the governmental interest is less here, where the primary issue is ballot
access in the primary election. Because minor candidates almost never win elections in
California, “there is not much of a government interest at stake when it comes to regulating minor
parties’ primaries.” Id.
223. “Despite the repeated claim that the two-party system promotes political stability, this
contention remains unproven.” Id. at 823.
224. Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 733 (1974); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 146 (1972);
see Ill. State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 189 (1979) (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring).
225. Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957, 965 (1982); Storer, 415 U.S. at 732; Bullock, 405
U.S. at 145.
226. Clements, 457 U.S. at 965; Ill. State Bd. of Elections, 440 U.S. at 185 (majority opinion);
Bullock, 405 U.S. at 145.
227. Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581, 593–94 (2005); Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428,
439–40 (1992); Storer, 415 U.S. at 735; Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 59–61 (1973); Rosario
v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752, 760–62 (1973); see Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520
U.S. 351, 377 (1997).
228. Bullock, 405 U.S. at 145.
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laws will not operate to reduce the number of candidates but will
merely determine whether certain candidates can list their preferred
party designation.
Second, as to the interest in preventing the overcrowding of the
ballot and the ensuing voter confusion that a lengthy ballot could
cause, that interest is also not implicated. In fact, candidates’ ability
to list their preference for their preferred party will actually serve to
reduce voter confusion. The party designation will give voters an
important cue—the most important cue they can receive—about the
candidates on the ballot.
Third, California’s ballot access laws will do nothing to prevent
runoff elections. Under Proposition 14, there will always be a general
election, regardless of whether the top-two vote-getters include one
candidate who received 99 percent of the vote and another who
received 1 percent of the vote, or two candidates who each received
less than 10 percent of the vote.
Fourth, the potential for party raiding will arise because of an
open-primary system, not because candidates can designate their
preference for a party. Specifically, it is much easier for party raiding
to occur when any voter can vote for any candidate, regardless of
party affiliation. While a well-organized party-raiding strategy could
be made easier if candidates are able to designate their party
preference, this attenuated argument hardly appears to rise to the
level of a compelling state interest sufficient to infringe on
fundamental rights.
Fifth, the one interest that arguably seems to be implicated by
California’s ballot access law is ensuring that the winner of the
election was the choice of at least a strong plurality. The following
example is illustrative: Imagine there are four candidates running for
state assembly. Candidate 1 prefers the Democratic Party and is
polling 30 percent of the vote. Candidate 2 prefers the Democratic
Party and is polling 15 percent of the vote. Candidate 3 prefers the
Republican Party and is polling 25 percent of the vote. Candidate 1
and Candidate 3 would be the top-two vote-getters and would
proceed to the general election. Candidate 4 then enters the race,
prefers the Libertarian Party, and is polling 11 percent of the vote.
Most of Candidate 4’s support comes from Candidate 3, who is now
polling 14 percent of the vote. Now Candidate 1 and Candidate 2 are
the top-two vote-getters.
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Arguably Candidate 4 would not have been able to garner as
much support, and hence siphon off as many voters from Candidate
3, if she were not able to designate her party preference. Her ability
to do so, therefore, has contributed to the fact that the top-two votegetters may not be the first choice of the plurality of voters, who
would prefer Candidate 3 were Candidate 4 not in the race. However,
the fact that voters changed their votes because they received the
information necessary to cast a meaningful ballot hardly seems to
dictate that candidates should not be allowed to give the voters
information about their party designation.
When analyzing the governmental interests that the Court has
found to be sufficient in ballot access cases and comparing them to
interests that could be served under California’s ballot access laws, it
becomes clear that California’s laws could not survive a heightened
level of review and would likely even fail under the Anderson
balancing test.
B. The Importance of Candidates’ Ability to
List Their Party Preference
When employing strict scrutiny, the Court should determine
whether the ballot access restrictions are narrowly tailored to serve
compelling governmental interests, assuming there are compelling
governmental interests at play. In doing so, the Court must determine
whether there are less burdensome alternatives to achieve the states’
asserted goals, without burdening the rights of candidates wishing to
list their party affiliation for a nonqualified political party and the
rights of voters wishing to cast their ballot for such candidates. In
doing this, the Court must acknowledge the important role that third
parties play in elections.229
Again, while third-party candidates will be able to appear on the
primary ballot in California, those candidates may be unable to
designate their party preference. Hence, many minor-party members
and voters inclined to vote for minor-party candidates may not know
that they have an opportunity to do so.230 This Article argues that, in
229. See Hasen, supra note 216, at 838 (“[M]inor parties play an important role in our
electoral process by enriching the political debate and thereby providing an additional reason for
protection.”).
230. Justice Kennedy in Burdick noted that “the right to vote for one’s preferred candidate
exists regardless of the likelihood that the candidate will be successful.” Burdick v. Takushi, 504
U.S. 428, 447 (1992).
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certain circumstances, lack of party affiliation may be equivalent to
total lack of access.
When the Court considers a party-affiliation prohibition, it
should properly weigh the candidate’s right to indicate the party of
her choosing and the voters’ right to cast a meaningful ballot and
effectively associate with like-minded people against the asserted
state interests. Justice Marshall, in both Illinois State Board of
Elections v. Socialist Workers Party231 and Munro, explained the
importance of third-party members’ ability to participate in elections.
Justice Marshall pointed to the “significant role that third parties
have played in the political development of the Nation.”232 Justice
Marshall described elections as “a means of disseminating ideas as
well as attaining political office.”233
Justice Marshall explained that minor parties can “broaden
political debate, expand the range of issues with which the electorate
is concerned, and influence the positions of the majority, in some
instances ultimately becoming majority positions.”234 Minor parties
give “an outlet for voters to express dissatisfaction with the
candidates or platforms of the major parties.”235
While the Court should employ strict scrutiny, even under a
lower level of review such as the Anderson balancing test the Court
must give due deference to the important role that third parties can
play and have played in elections.
V. CALIFORNIA SHOULD CHANGE THE ELECTIONS CODE
In addition to employing strict scrutiny, and therefore giving
more credence to voters’ and minor parties’ rights and less deference
to states’ asserted interests, there is a quick and straightforward fix to
many of the problems Proposition 14 creates. The legislature should
change the elections code, specifically the qualification threshold.
Parties should be able to maintain ballot-qualified status based on the
number of votes a party member obtains in the primary rather than
the general election.

231.
232.
233.
234.
235.

440 U.S. 173 (1979).
Ill. State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. at 185.
Id. at 186 (emphasis added).
Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 415 U.S. 189, 200 (1986).
Id.
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Minor parties could actually fare better under this proposal.
Under Proposition 14, any voter can vote for any candidate. This
means that candidates who have designated a preference for a minor
party on the ballot can appeal to all primary voters, not just those
voters who are registered members of that minor party.
Further, California should change its elections code to allow for
the counting of write-in votes in the general election. This will
reduce the restrictive nature of California’s ballot access laws and
allow some voters to support the candidates of their choosing in both
elections. Even assuming write-in candidates will not succeed, “it
can never be right to deny citizens the ultimate right to cast ballots
for the candidates of their choice.”236
CONCLUSION
With the passage and enactment of Proposition 14, the Supreme
Court may have another opportunity to evaluate its deeply flawed
approach to ballot access restrictions. Prior Supreme Court case law
has demonstrated undue deference to the states’ asserted interests in
passing such laws and little regard for the important role that minor
parties can play in campaigns. The Court should employ strict
scrutiny to ballot access restrictions that target minor parties and
properly scrutinize the states’ proffered interests in passing these
restrictions.
In California, few of the governmental interests the Court has
found to be sufficient are even implicated by the passage of
Proposition 14 and related provisions of the California Elections
Code. Hence, the Court should strike down California’s ballot access
laws as unconstitutional infringements on minor-party members’ and
voters’ rights. In addition, or in the alternative, California should
change its elections code to allow parties to remain ballot qualified
based on votes obtained in the primary election and should allow for
write-in votes.

236. Raskin, supra note 45, at 572.

